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ABSTRACT 
 
Short-sellers and Analysts as Providers of Complementary Information about Future 
Firm Performance. (May 2009) 
Michael Stephen Drake, B.S., Brigham Young University; 
M.Acc., Brigham Young University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Senyo Tse 
 
 This study examines whether short-sellers and financial analysts develop 
complementary information about future earnings and returns and assesses whether 
investors can improve predictions made by each of these intermediaries using 
information provided by the other.  The first main result is that the relative short interest 
ratio (shares sold short divided by total shares outstanding) contains information that is 
useful for predicting future earnings, beyond (i.e., incremental to) the information in 
analyst forecasts.  I also find that analysts do not fully incorporate short interest 
information into their forecasts and demonstrate that analyst forecasts can be improved 
(i.e., can be made to be less biased and more accurate) by adjusting for short interest 
information.  The second main result is that analyst forecast revisions contain 
information that is useful for predicting future abnormal returns, beyond the information 
in the relative short interest ratio.  I demonstrate that portfolios of stocks formed based 
on consistent signals from short-sellers and analysts produce abnormal return spreads 
that are significantly larger than spreads produced by portfolios formed using signals 
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from short-sellers alone.  Collectively, the evidence suggests that short-sellers and 
analyst provide complementary information about future firm performance that is useful 
to investors. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Short-sellers are informed investors who take positions in firms whose stock 
price they expect to underperform in the future.  Since short-sellers profit by anticipating 
stock price declines, they are broadly labeled by the financial press as ―bears‖ or 
pessimistic investors.  In contrast, financial analysts are generally characterized as being 
overly optimistic about future stock and earnings performance.1  While extensive 
research investigates financial analysts role as information intermediaries, recent 
research takes initial steps at examining the potential role of short-sellers as information 
intermediaries in the capital markets (Pownall and Simko 2005; Akbas et al 2008).  The 
objective of this study is to investigate whether short-sellers and analysts develop 
complementary information about future firm performance and to assess whether 
investors can improve predictions made by one intermediary by using information 
provided by the other. 
 I investigate short-sellers and analysts because they both predict future firm 
performance and because their incentives make it likely that they develop different types 
of value-relevant information.  Short-sellers seek to profit from their predictions of stock 
price declines.  Analysts predict earnings and must balance incentives to make accurate 
predictions with incentives to maintain relationships with management (Francis and 
                                                 
This dissertation follows the style of The Accounting Review. 
1 This characterization is based on the distributions of stock recommendations, which prior research finds 
to be heavily skewed towards ―buy‖ and of analyst forecast errors, which prior research finds to be 
negative on average.  See, for example, Abarbanell (1991), Ali et al. (1992), McNichols and O’Brien 
(1997), Easterwood and Nutt (1999), and Bradshaw et al. (2001).    
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Philbrick 1993; Lim 2001).2  These differences suggest that short sellers and analysts 
uncover unique information and that investors may be able to infer incremental 
information about future performance from each intermediary.  The similarities and 
differences between short-sellers and analysts motivate my two research questions.   
 My first research question is whether short interest positions contain information 
that is useful for predicting future earnings, beyond the information available from 
analyst earnings forecasts.  Extant research suggests that short-sellers are informed about 
future stock price movements (Diamond and Verrecchia 1987; Asquith and Meulbroek 
1996; Dechow et al. 2001; Desai et al. 2002; Asquith et al. 2005; Boehmer et al. 2008).  
The information used by short-sellers to predict returns is also likely to predict earnings 
because short-sellers may discover information related to future earnings news that other 
market participants do not have or short-sellers may uncover price-relevant information 
on events that will be reflected in current or future earnings (Collins et al. 1987; 
Warfield and Wild 1992).3  However, analyst forecasts may not fully reflect information 
from short-sellers.  Analysts may be reluctant to damage relationships with management 
by updating their forecasts with pessimistic information (Francis and Philbrick 1993; 
Lim 2001), and they may under-react to the information because they view short interest 
as an unreliable signal about future earnings (Abarbanell 1991; Abarbanell and Bernard  
                                                 
2 Issuing earnings forecast is just one of a group of services that sell-side analysts provide to their clients 
(e.g., they also issue stock recommendations, target prices, and growth forecasts).  I focus solely on 
earnings forecasts because one of the objectives of my study is to investigate whether short-sellers and 
analysts develop complementary information about future earnings. 
3 For example, a short-seller might take a short position based on information about the future product 
recalls.  Here, the negative stock price reaction at the time of the recall announcement will occur before 
the earnings effects of the recalls are recognized.  
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1992).  If the short interest information is not fully subsumed by analyst forecasts, then 
investors could improve the accuracy of those forecasts by incorporating short interest 
information.  
My second research question is whether analyst earnings forecasts (i.e., forecast 
revisions) contain information that is useful for predicting future abnormal returns, 
beyond the information available in short interest.  Short interest positions reflect short-
sellers’ predictions of future stock price performance.  In contrast, analysts’ earnings 
forecasts focus on reported earnings, and are not intended to predict returns.  
Nevertheless, prior studies find that analyst forecast revisions are positively associated 
with subsequent returns (Mendenhall 1991; Stickel 1991; Chan et al. 1996; Shane and 
Brous 2001; Barth and Hutton 2004), which suggests that analyst forecast revisions can 
be used to predict future returns.  Thus, I also examine the extent to which forecast 
revisions contain information that is incrementally useful for predicting future returns by 
testing whether short interest fully subsumes the information in analyst forecast 
revisions.  If the information in forecast revisions is not fully subsumed by short interest, 
then investors could improve their returns predictions using short interest by 
incorporating information provided by financial analysts.     
I address my research questions using a large sample of monthly short interest 
data from 1988 to 2002 for firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX), and NASDAQ Stock Exchange.   My short interest 
variable is the relative short interest (RSI) ratio, calculated as shares sold short divided 
by total shares outstanding.  My analysis is based on two sets of empirical tests.   
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The first set of tests investigates whether short interest positions contain 
information that is useful for predicting future earnings, beyond the information in 
analyst forecasts.  I find that the RSI ratio is negatively associated with earnings levels 
and changes disclosed in the next two quarterly earnings announcements, which I label 
―quarter-one‖ and ―quarter-two‖ respectively.4  These associations hold after controlling 
for the information in the consensus analyst forecast, prior period earnings, prior period 
returns, and various firm characteristics (e.g., size, book-to-market).  I also find that the 
strength of the association between the RSI ratio and earnings levels and changes are 
statistically equivalent in quarter-one and quarter-two.  This evidence is consistent with 
short-sellers’ use of information that predicts earnings, and with that information not 
being fully embedded in the consensus earnings forecast.   
I also find that the RSI ratio is negatively associated with analyst forecast errors 
(actual EPS minus forecast EPS) in quarter-one and in quarter-two.  This result is robust 
to controls for variables that prior studies find to be significantly associated with 
forecasts errors and suggests that analyst forecasts do not fully reflect short interest 
information. Third, I demonstrate that consensus analyst forecasts can be improved by 
adjusting the forecasts for information in short interest about future earnings. 
Specifically, I adjust current-period analyst forecasts using the historical relationship 
between RSI ratios and analyst forecast errors.  I find that adjusted consensus analyst 
                                                 
4 I focus on the two earnings announcements subsequent to the short interest measurement date because 
although examining the association between short interest and quarter-one earnings is the natural starting 
point, changes in prices generally lead changes in earnings (Collins et al. 1987; Warfield and Wild 1992).  
Thus, I also examine quarter-two earnings.  This allows me to investigate whether any associations hold 
over a longer earnings horizon. 
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forecasts are significantly less biased and more accurate than are the raw consensus 
analyst forecasts.   
The second set of tests investigates whether analyst forecast revisions contain 
information that is useful for predicting future abnormal returns beyond the information 
in short interest.  I find that analyst forecast revisions are positively associated with 
abnormal returns over the six months following the forecast revision date, after 
controlling for the information in the RSI ratio and for other common risk factors (i.e., 
size, book-to-market, momentum).5  This suggests that analyst forecast revisions contain 
information that is incrementally useful for predicting future returns, beyond the 
information in short interest. 
Next, I demonstrate that portfolios of stocks formed based on information from 
both short-sellers and analysts produce larger spreads in future abnormal returns than do 
portfolios of stocks formed based on information from short-sellers alone.  Specifically, 
I find a nearly monotonic negative relationship between portfolios of RSI ratios and 
future abnormal returns.  The lowest portfolio of RSI ratios earns significant abnormal 
returns of 3.0% over the following 6 months, while the highest portfolio earns significant 
abnormal returns of -3.7% over the same period, resulting in a return spread of 6.7%.  
When I partition each short interest decile into three portfolios based on the sign of the 
consensus analyst revision (i.e., positive revision, no revision, or negative revision), I 
find that the return spread between portfolios formed based on consistent signals is 
larger than the return spread based on short interest alone.  Specifically, the return spread 
                                                 
5 All returns results are qualitatively similar using a 3-month horizon.   
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between the portfolio with the lowest RSI ratios and positive consensus forecast 
revisions (so good news & good news) the portfolio with the highest RSI ratios and 
negative consensus forecast revisions (so bad news & bad news) is 12.2%.  
Finally, since the portfolio return analyses described above are based on stock 
returns adjusted for the market return only, I re-perform the portfolio analyses using 
alphas estimated from a four-factor regression model.  This allows me to control for 
additional risk factors that are correlated with returns (i.e., market return, size, book-to-
market, and momentum).  I find that the portfolio results are robust to these additional 
controls. 
Taken together, the results from these empirical tests suggest that short-sellers 
and financial analysts develop complementary information about future earnings and 
returns.  The results also demonstrate that predictions made by one intermediary can be 
improved upon by incorporating information provided by the other intermediary.   
Broadly, these results contribute to the literature by illustrating the benefits of 
incorporating information from multiple intermediaries when predicting future firm 
performance.  Specifically, the results imply that investors who use analyst forecasts to 
make investment decisions (e.g., in valuation models) can benefit from adjusting the 
analyst forecasts using short interest information.  The results also imply that investors 
may benefit from taking long positions in stocks with low RSI ratios and positive 
consensus forecast revisions and that they should be particularly wary of holding long 
positions in stocks with high RSI ratios and negative consensus forecast revisions.  
 7 
In addition to its investment implications, this study contributes to several 
streams of literature.  I contribute to the earnings prediction and short interest literatures 
by showing that short interest positions contain information that is useful for predicting 
earnings levels and changes disclosed in the next two earnings announcements.  The 
results complement prior research by providing additional evidence that short-sellers 
possess value-relevant information.  I contribute to the analyst forecast literature by 
documenting that analyst forecasts do not fully reflect short interest information.  
Finally, I show that the signal in high levels of short interest (e.g., bad news may be on 
the horizon) can be further refined by using analyst forecast revisions. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  In Section 2, I provide 
some background on short-selling, discuss the relevant literature, and develop my 
hypotheses.  In Section 3, I discuss my sample selection criteria and variable 
measurements, and I provide descriptive statistics.  Section 4 presents the empirical 
models and results.  Section 5 concludes.   
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS 
 In this section, I begin by providing some background on short-selling in the 
United States.  I then review relevant studies that examine the activities of short-sellers 
and financial analysts in the capital markets.  Finally, I motivate and present my 
empirical predictions.   
2.1. Background on Short-Selling 
 A short sale is defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as 
―the sale of a security that the seller does not own or that the seller owns but does not 
deliver‖ (SEC 1999).  In a typical short sale, the investor borrows shares from current 
stock owners for a fee and then sells the shares at the current stock price in the open 
market.6  At a future date, the investor closes the short position by buying back the 
shares in the open market, and then returning the shares to the lender.  Thus, a short 
position is profitable when the stock price declines, and a short-seller’s maximum 
theoretical profit is realized when the stock price falls to zero.    
Investors take short positions in firms for a variety of reasons.  For example, they 
may believe that the stock is over-valued based on publicly available information, or 
they may have private information about future bad news.  Investors also take short 
positions as part of merger- or convertible-debt arbitrage strategies.  In a merger-
arbitrage strategy, investors take long positions in the target-firm and short positions in 
the acquiring-firm.  Here, the investors assume that the target-firm is trading below its  
                                                 
6 Brokerage houses typically have their own stock loan department from which investors can borrow 
stock. 
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acquisition price per share.  They believe that the target-firm’s stock price will rise to 
reflect the acquisition price and that the acquiring-firm’s stock price will fall to reflect 
the per-share cost of the acquisition.  In a convertible debt-arbitrage strategy, investors 
buy the convertible debt of a firm and simultaneously take short positions in the stock of 
that firm.  Here, the investors hedge their investment in the convertible debt, which they 
believe is undervalued, by selling the stock short.7    
The nature of the short position carries additional risks and costs relative to 
taking the more traditional long position.  The theoretical downside risk to a short 
position increases without limit as the stock price rises, which is in stark contrast to the 
limited liability of a long position.  Short positions are also susceptible to recall risk and 
to short squeezes.  Recall occurs when the lender recalls the loan of shares and the 
investor is required to cover the position prematurely.  A short squeeze occurs when the 
stock price begins to rise and short-sellers are forced to close their positions by buying 
shares, which further increases the stock price and leads to further losses.  Finally, there 
is a significant opportunity cost associated with short positions because the proceeds 
from the short-sale of a stock are not immediately available to the short-seller, but are 
held in an escrow account until the position is closed.  This is costly to the short-seller 
because the proceeds cannot be invested elsewhere.     
The magnitude of RSI ratios in the U.S. market has increased considerably over  
                                                 
7 These arbitrage-motivated short positions generally exploit relative price movements of the two 
securities and do not reflect the investors’ expectations about a given firm’s future stock price declines 
and/or future earnings.  As such they add noise to my empirical analyses, which biases against my  
finding results (Dechow et al. 2001).   
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the past few decades.  Figure 1 plots the mean and median RSI ratio over my sample 
period.  Dechow et al. (2001) find similar increases in the RSI ratio using firms traded 
on the NYSE and AMEX stock exchanges from 1976 through 1993.  The increase in 
RSI ratios over time is generally attributed to the emergence of hedge funds and to the 
deregulation of short-sale constraints (Dechow et al. 2001).      
 
 
FIGURE 1 
Mean and Median Relative Short Interest Ratios over Time 
 
 
________________ 
Figure 1 reports the mean and median relative short interest ratio calculated by calendar year.   The sample 
consists of 90,427 firm-quarter observations from the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stock exchanges for 
the 1988 to 2002 time-period.   
 
 
 
2.2. Relevant Literature on Short-Selling 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) suggest that only informed traders who have 
strong beliefs that a significant stock price decline will occur in the near-term will 
choose to sell stock short.  This follows the idea that the high costs of short-selling are 
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likely to drive out uninformed traders, so that prices reflect trades by more informed 
investors.  Their theoretical model demonstrates that an unexpected increase in short 
interest predicts a price decline.   
Subsequent to Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), several empirical studies tested 
the theoretical prediction that short interest predicts negative returns.  Brent et al. (1990) 
use a small sample of approximately 200 stocks and find no evidence that short interest 
predicts returns in the month following an increase in short interest.  However, they do 
find that high short interest is significantly associated with high betas and the presence 
of stock options and convertible securities, leading the authors to conclude that arbitrage 
and hedging strategies drive short interest changes.  Senchack and Stark (1993) re-
examine the relation between substantial increases in short interest and returns using a 
larger and more refined sample than that used by Brent et al. (1990).  Specifically, they 
investigate 2,400 stocks with large percentage increases in short interest that meet three 
conditions: (i) the stock’s short interest information is published in the Wall Street 
Journal, (ii) the stock has not been reported as being a target for arbitrage short-selling, 
and (iii) the reported change in short interest is greater than 100% over the prior month.  
These requirements are important because they likely purge the sample of non-
information based short-selling.  The authors investigate 30 trading days of returns 
centered on the short interest publication date and, consistent with the prediction of 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), find small negative abnormal returns after the 
announcement in this short window.   
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 The empirical studies just mentioned investigate returns to changes in short 
interest positions over relatively short windows (e.g., one month or less).  Asquith and 
Meulbroek (1996) is the first study to examine the long-run returns to portfolios of 
stocks with extremely high levels of short interest as measured by RSI ratios.  Using 
stocks in the 95th percentile of RSI ratios, they find average size-adjusted returns of -
18% when the stock remains at this level of short interest.  Over the two-year period 
subsequent to dropping out of the 95th percentile, the average size-adjusted return is -
23%.  Subsequent to Asquith and Meulbroek (1996), several empirical papers use a 
similar long-window approach and find that portfolios of stocks with high levels of short 
interest are associated with negative subsequent returns (see, e.g., Dechow et al. 2001; 
Desai et al. 2002; Asquith et al. 2005).   
 In recent years, daily and intraday short interest data has become available for 
academic research.  These data provide a much richer set of information than the 
monthly short interest measure used in early research.  Boehmer et al. (2008) investigate 
whether short-sellers are informed investors using daily NYSE order data.  They find 
that on average short-sellers are ―extremely well informed.‖  They demonstrate that 
portfolios of heavily shorted stocks underperform portfolios of lightly shorted stocks by 
1.16% over a period of 20 trading days (15.6% annualized), after adjusting for risk.  
Overall, the results of the empirical studies which investigate the association between 
short interest and subsequent returns offer two broad conclusions relevant to this study—
first, that short-sellers are informed about future returns and, second, that the ability of 
the RSI ratio to predict returns increases with the level of short interest.      
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 Another stream in the short-selling literature investigates short-sellers’ trading 
strategies.  In general, this literature seeks to better understand how short-sellers identify 
their targets.   Dechow et al. (2001) find that short-selling is consistent with trading 
strategies based on fundamental analysis.  Specifically, they find that short-sellers take 
positions in stocks with relatively low fundamental-to-price ratios.8  Cao et al. (2007) 
find that short-sellers exploit post-earnings-announcement drift and the accrual anomaly 
by taking short positions in firms that announce negative earnings surprises and/or that 
announce earnings with a high accrual component.   Desai et al. (2007) find that short-
sellers are more likely to target firms with large increases in sales, gross margin, and 
selling, general, and administrative expenses.   
A third line of research investigates whether short-sellers appear to anticipate 
announcements of bad news.  Using restatement announcements, Efendi et al. (2005) 
and Desai et al. (2006) find that short-sellers take positions in firms several months in 
advance of earnings restatement announcements, suggesting that short-sellers target 
firms with poor earnings quality.  Griffin (2003) finds that short interest increases 
significantly in the months leading up to restatements made by firms that later face 
allegations of fraud in class action law-suits.  Akbas et al. (2008) find that short interest 
levels are negatively associated with subsequent bad news announcements of various 
types.9     
                                                 
8 Dechow et al. (2001) investigate four fundamental-to-price ratios: cash-flow-to-price; earnings-to-price; 
book-to-market; and value-to-market.  
9 Akbas et al. (2008) measure public news using the database of news headlines from Chan (2003).  The 
database consists of news items from the Dow Jones Interactive Publications Library.  In Chan (2003), a 
reading of each news headline was used to determine whether the news item revealed good, bad, or no 
news.  See Table 3 of Chan (2003), for examples of each news classification.   
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Extant research has also taken initial steps to address the question of whether 
short-sellers anticipate future earnings news.10  Christophe et al. (2004) investigate daily 
short interest over the five days preceding earnings announcements.  They find that 
short-sellers significantly increase their positions before negative earnings surprises.  
What is unique about Christophe et al. (2004) is their use of a proprietary dataset of daily 
short interest.  However, the use of this dataset constrains their sample to only 913 
NASDAQ stocks from September 13 through December 12, 2000, which raises concerns 
about whether their sample is representative of firms listed on other exchanges and of 
short interest behavior in other time periods.  Daske et al. (2005) re-examine these issues 
by using a larger sample of approximately 4,000 daily short sale transactions for NYSE 
stocks listed from April 2004 to March 2005 and find conflicting results.  Specifically, 
they find no evidence of a concentration of short interest transactions prior to 
announcements of bad earnings news.  The authors conjecture that the removal of 
investor access to selective disclosures by Regulation FD may be contributing to the 
difference between their results and the results of Christophe et al. (2004).    
Three concurrent studies provide additional evidence that short positions are 
associated with earnings information.  Akbas et al. (2008) finds that short interest levels 
are negatively associated with earnings surprises calculated using the most recent 
quarterly earnings.  Francis et al. (2008) find that realized earnings for firms with high 
levels of unexpected short interest are more likely to fall short of the consensus analyst 
                                                 
10 I extend this line of research in two ways.  First, I examine the relation between short interest and 
earnings levels and changes over the next two quarterly earnings announcements.  Second, I test whether 
the information contained in short interest about future earnings is subsumed by information in analyst 
earnings forecasts.   
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forecast before the unexpected increase in short interest.11  The authors infer that short-
sellers are able to identify firms whose fundamentals the market has over-estimated.  
Desai et al. (2007) investigate a small sample of 67 firms identified by an independent 
research firms as potential targets for short-selling. They provide anecdotal evidence that 
24 of the 67 firms (or 36%) reported ―lower than expected earnings‖ during the 12-
month period after the independent research firm released its report.12   
Finally, Pownall and Simko (2005) initiated a new line of short-selling research 
by examining whether short sellers act as information intermediaries in the capital 
markets.  The authors assert that short-sellers’ ex post observable trades are a proxy for 
their information-processing and forecasting activities.  They examine abnormal returns 
around large increases in short interest (spikes).  They find that the average abnormal 
return for the 5-day period following the public announcement of the short-spike are 
negative, but ―very modest‖ (10 basis points over 6 trading days) and insignificantly 
different from zero.13  However, when they partition their sample on low analyst 
following (no more than one analyst) versus high analyst following (more than one 
analyst), they find negative and economically significant abnormal returns around the 
236 short-interest spikes in the low following group (mean = -1.5%) and insignificant 
positive returns around the 1,441 short-interest spikes in the high following group (mean 
                                                 
11 Francis et al. (2008) use prediction errors from a monthly model of short interest to proxy for 
unexpected short interest, and use analyst forecast revisions and forecast errors to proxy for the market’s 
expectations of future earnings.  Although I use many of the variables employed by Francis et al. (2008) in 
my analysis, their research question, research design, and inferences differ considerably from mine.   
12 Note that this evidence is based on a small sample of firms identified as potential targets for short-
selling and as such, does not reflect the actual investment decisions of short-sellers.     
13 The authors identify the public announcement of the short spike using the disclosure dates reported in 
the Dow Jones Newswire.   
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= 0.12%).   Pownall and Simko (2005) also find that abnormal returns for firms with 
high analyst following are negatively associated with prior earnings levels, which 
suggests that investors believe short-interest spikes provide information about the 
sustainability of these firms’ earnings.  However, Pownall and Simko (2005) do not 
investigate the extent to which short interest predicts future earnings levels and changes 
or whether information from analysts subsumes the information in short interest about 
future earnings.  I investigate this relationship in this study.  
2.3. Relevant Literature on Financial Analysts 
 A long line of prior research finds that analyst earnings forecasts convey new 
information to the market.  For example, Givoly and Lakonishok (1979) find significant 
abnormal returns during the four-month period surrounding analyst forecast revisions.  
Francis and Soffer (1997) examine abnormal returns around analyst stock report 
publication dates and demonstrate that earnings forecast revisions contain information 
beyond other information in stock recommendations.   Several other studies find 
evidence of a significant contemporaneous association between analyst forecast 
revisions and stock price movements (see, e.g., Griffin 1976; Lys and Sohn 1990; Stickel 
1991; Gleason and Lee 2003).  Furthermore, prior research finds that forecast accuracy 
is associated with favorable career outcomes, suggesting that forecast accuracy is 
important to analysts.  For example, Stickel (1992) finds that analysts on the Industrial 
Investor All-American Research Team have more accurate earnings forecasts relative to 
other analysts.  Mikhail et al. (1999) find that analysts with less accurate forecasts are 
more likely to change brokerage houses, which they label ―turnover.‖  They assume that 
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turnover of poorer-performing analysts is primarily dominated by terminations, rather 
than by the analysts seeking a better job. Hong et al. (2000) extend the analyses of 
Mikhail et al. (1999) by assuming that an analyst is terminated only if the analyst stops 
producing forecasts for all firms they follow in I/B/E/S.  Consistent with Mikhail et al. 
(1999), they find that less accurate analysts are more likely to be terminated (exit 
I/B/E/S).  Finally, Hong and Kubik (2003) investigate whether analyst forecast accuracy 
affects job changes within the brokerage firm.   They find that analysts whose forecast 
are more accurate relative to their peers are more likely to be promoted within the 
brokerage hierarchy and that analysts whose forecasts are less accurate are more likely to 
be demoted.  Overall, this line of research suggests that analysts have incentives to issue 
accurate forecasts.   
Another line of research finds that analyst earnings forecasts are optimistic on 
average (see, e.g., Abarbanell 1991; Ali et al. 1992; McNichols and O’Brien 1997; 
Easterwood and Nutt 1999; Richardson et al. 2004).   Several studies offer explanations 
for this optimism.  A theoretical model developed in Lim (2001) suggests that rational 
analysts who aim to improve their earnings forecast accuracy may optimally produce 
optimistic forecasts.  This is because analysts must balance their incentive to issue 
accurate earnings forecasts with their incentive to maintain positive relationships with 
firm managers, who are a key source of information about earnings.  Consistent with this 
idea, McNichols and O’Brien (1997) suggest that the observed optimistic-bias in analyst 
forecasts is partly due to analysts’ reluctance to update their forecasts with pessimistic 
information.  Chan et al. (1996) argue that analysts may wait for other analysts to 
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respond first to bad news to avoid antagonizing management or that analysts may choose 
to wait for additional evidence before adjusting their estimates downward.   Evidence 
also suggests that favorable career outcomes are linked to optimistic forecasts.  Hong 
and Kubik (2003) find that analysts who issue relatively optimistic forecasts are more 
likely to be promoted within the brokerage firm.    
 A related line of research investigates analyst inefficiency with respect to 
publicly available information, including prior returns (Abarbanell 1991), earnings 
(Abarbanell and Bernard 1992), accruals (Bradshaw et al. 2001), and other financial 
statement items such as inventory and gross margin (Abarbanell and Bushee 1997).  This 
research finds that analysts generally under-react to publicly available information, so 
that the association between the information and analyst forecast errors is in the same 
direction as the association between the information and future earnings.14  Easterwood 
and Nutt (1999) find that analysts systematically under-react to bad news.  Griffin 
(2003) examines analyst reactions to earnings restatements and finds limited evidence 
that analysts reduce their forecasts ahead of such disclosures.  However, Griffin (2003) 
finds strong evidence that the largest forecast revisions occur in the month of the 
disclosure suggesting that analysts simply react to the news rather than anticipate it.15   
                                                 
14 One explanation for the observed analyst inefficiency offered by these papers is that analysts are unable 
to collect and interpret public signals.  This explanation suggests a lack of sophistication on the part of 
analysts.  Another explanation is that analysts only update their forecasts when they obtain new private 
information about a firm.   
15 Overall, Griffin (2003) concludes that analysts are more reluctant than other sophisticated parties (i.e., 
insiders, short-sellers, and institutions) to update their publicly observable beliefs to reflect bad news. 
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2.4. Motivation 
To summarize, prior research finds that short-sellers are informed investors who 
have information about the cross-section of future returns.  Prior research on financial 
analysts finds that analyst predictions of earnings provide useful information to the 
market.  It also finds that their forecasts are, on average, optimistically-biased, and are 
inefficient with respect to available information.   
Thus, the literatures on short-sellers and analysts suggest that these two groups 
are similar in that they both anticipate future performance.  Analysts incorporate their 
predictions in earnings forecasts, while short-sellers trade on their forecasts.  Both 
groups have incentives to anticipate future performance accurately.  This raises the 
question of whether investors can infer incremental information about future 
performance from each intermediary.   
Despite the similarities between short-sellers and analysts, their performance 
metrics and incentives are different.   Short-sellers predict stock returns and must weigh 
the potential benefits of taking the short position against the accompanying costs and 
risks.  Analysts predict earnings, and must balance incentives to issue accurate forecasts 
and to maintain relationships with managers (Lim 2001).  These differences suggest that 
short-sellers and analysts may use (i.e., respond to) different information sets and/or use 
similar information sets differently to make their predictions.  If this is the case, 
investors could infer incremental and complementary information about future earnings 
and returns from each intermediary.   
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Most extant research investigates whether short interest or analyst earnings 
forecasts in isolation predict future firm performance.16  As discussed above, studies in 
accounting and finance find that short interest predicts future returns (Dechow et al. 
2001; Desai et al. 2002; Asquith et al. 2005; Akbas et al. 2008) and future earnings 
(Christophe et al. 2005; Akbas et al. 2008; Francis et al. 2008).  However, these studies 
do not simultaneously control for analyst earnings forecasts in their models.  Controlling 
for earnings forecasts is important because information contained in short interest about 
future performance may already be reflected in more readily available information 
provided by financial analysts.  In this study, I simultaneously assess the incremental 
usefulness of information provided by short-sellers and financial analysts.  This 
approach allows me to address the question of whether these two intermediaries develop 
complementary information about future performance.  The integrated analyses, together 
with the similarities and differences between short-sellers and analysts discussed above, 
motivate the empirical predictions that follow.  
2.5. Empirical Predictions 
The information used by short-sellers to predict returns is also likely to predict 
earnings for two reasons.  First, prior studies document that return volatility increases 
around earnings announcements (Beaver 1968) and that the announcement of bad 
                                                 
16Several extant studies in finance incorporate variables from financial analyst and short-seller activities 
into their empirical models.  For example, Boehmer and Kelley (2007) find that institutional ownership is 
negatively associated with stock price efficiency, controlling for short interest and/or analyst following.  
Danielson and Sorescu (2001) and Boehme et al. (2007) both examine Miller’s (1977) hypothesis that 
dispersion of investor beliefs, in the presence of short-sale constraints, results in stock price overvaluation.  
These studies use variation in analyst earnings forecast to proxy for the dispersion of investor beliefs.   
However, these studies do not examine whether short-sellers and analysts develop complementary 
information about future performance.    
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earnings news is associated with stock price declines (Brown et al 1987).  Thus, short-
sellers have incentives to uncover information that helps them anticipate future earnings 
news.  Second, even if short-sellers do not specifically focus on earnings, prior studies 
find that stock returns and accounting earnings are positively correlated (Kothari 2001) 
and that some events which affect stock prices are recognized in the accounting system 
with a lag (Collins et al. 1987).  More specifically, Warfield and Wild (1992) state that 
prices generally lead earnings because an informed market reacts to economic events as 
they occur, but earnings must wait for compliance with formal accounting recognition 
criteria.  Thus, short-sellers may anticipate events that lead to stock price declines and 
that are reflected in current or subsequent quarters’ earnings.   
Incentives to provide accurate forecasts should lead financial analysts to 
incorporate all available information in their forecasts.  However, analyst forecasts may 
not fully reflect the information in short interest about future earnings (i.e., analysts may 
under-react to the information) for a variety of reasons.  Analysts may share short-sellers 
beliefs, but choose not to adjust their forecasts either because they are reluctant to 
damage relationships with management by updating their forecasts with pessimistic 
information (Francis and Philbrick 1993; McNichols and O’Brien 1997; Lim 2001) or 
because they are uncertain about the timing of the earnings effect.  Analysts may 
systematically under-react to the earnings information in the RSI ratio, just as they do to 
the other public signals (Abarbanell 1991; Abarbanell and Bernard 1992; Bradshaw et al. 
2001; Abarbanell and Bushee 1997; Easterwood and Nutt 1999).  Finally, analysts may 
view short interest as an unreliable signal about future earnings because they view short-
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sellers as mere story-tellers who do not conduct rigorous fundamental analyses and/or 
who fabricate bad news about their target-firm in order to drive stock prices down.     
This discussion suggests that short interest contains information that is useful for 
predicting earnings and it is an empirical question whether analyst earnings forecasts 
fully subsume this information.   My first hypothesis is as follows:   
H1:  The relative short interest ratio contains information that is useful for predicting 
earnings beyond the information available in analyst earnings forecasts. 
As discussed above, short interest serves as a proxy for short-sellers’ predictions 
of future returns (SEC 1999; Pownall and Simko 2005) and, on average, firms with the 
highest RSI ratios experience negative future abnormal returns (Asquith and Meulbroek 
1996; Dechow et al. 2001; Desai et al. 2002; Asquith et al. 2005).  Empirical evidence 
also suggests that analyst forecasts predict future abnormal returns.  For example, 
Mendenhall (1991) finds a positive association between forecast revisions and abnormal 
returns around the two subsequent earnings announcements.  Stickel (1991) finds that 
the market assimilates the information in forecast revisions slowly; he documents that 
stock prices continue to drift in the direction of a revision for up to six months following 
the revision.  Barth and Hutton (2004) find that portfolios formed based on the sign of 
consensus analyst forecast revisions earn spreads in abnormal returns of 5.5 percent over 
the next year.17    
                                                 
17 Consistent with Barth and Hutton (2004), Chan et al. (1996) also find that portfolios of stocks formed 
based on past consensus forecast revisions produces significant spreads in abnormal returns over the 6-
months following the portfolio formation.   
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These findings suggest that analyst forecast revisions contain information that is 
useful for predicting future earnings and it is an empirical question whether short interest 
fully subsumes this information.  My second hypothesis is as follows:   
H2:  Analyst forecast revisions contain information that is useful for predicting 
abnormal returns beyond the information available in the relative short interest 
ratio. 
 Overall, evidence consistent with H1 and H2 would suggest that short-sellers and 
financial analysts develop complementary information that is useful for predicting 
earnings and returns.  After presenting test related to each hypothesis, I also test whether 
investors can improve predictions made by one intermediary by incorporating 
information provided by the other. 
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3. SAMPLE SELECTION, VARIABLE MEASUREMENT, 
AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
3.1. Sample Selection and Variable Measurement 
My empirical tests require quarterly financial statement data as well as data on 
short interest, stock returns, and analyst forecasts.  I obtain short interest data from a 
publicly available dataset compiled in machine-readable form from the NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ stock exchanges.  The dataset reports monthly short interest levels 
covering the 1988 to 2002 time period.18  The stock exchanges compile short interest for 
individual stocks on the 15th day of each month, or the proceeding business day if the 
15th is not a business day.  I label this date the short interest measurement date.  In 
general, the NYSE/AMEX exchanges disclose short interest information to the public 
within the following four business days and the NASDAQ discloses the information 
within the following eight business days (Jones and Larsen 2004).  Consequently, I add 
four and eight business days to the 15th for the NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ exchanges 
respectively, and label this subsequent date the short interest publication date.  
Following prior studies (Asquith and Meulbroek 1996; Dechow et al. 2001; Desai et al. 
2002; Asquith et al. 2005), I calculate the relative short interest ratio, RSIratio, by 
dividing the number of shares sold short by the number of shares outstanding.  Since I 
test my predictions in a quarterly setting, I measure the RSIratio as of last month of the 
fiscal quarter.   
                                                 
18 AMEX short interest data is only available for the 1995 to 2002 period.   
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  I obtain financial statement data from the COMPUSTAT Quarterly database and 
require that sample observations have data on assets [data44], share price [data14], 
shares outstanding [data61], and value of book equity [data59] for the prior and current 
fiscal quarters.  I also require the date of the quarterly earnings announcement [RDQE] 
for the prior, current, and next fiscal quarters.  Finally, I remove all observations that 
report quarter-end stock prices of less than one dollar.19   
My empirical tests are further restricted to firms with available stock return data 
obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database and with 
quarterly earnings [EPS] and consensus analyst forecast data obtained from I/B/E/S.  In 
particular, I require that CRSP returns data be available for the period beginning twelve-
months before the prior fiscal quarter-end date and ending six-months after the last 
consensus analyst forecast preceding the earnings announcement date for the current 
fiscal quarter.  I also require that I/B/E/S quarterly EPS and consensus forecasts data be 
available for the prior, current, and next fiscal quarters and that the last consensus 
analyst forecast for the current fiscal quarter occur after the short interest publication 
date.         
Imposing the data requirements detailed above on the intersection of the 
COMPUSTAT, CRSP, I/B/E/S and short interest databases yields a final sample of 
90,427 firm-quarter observations.20  Appendix A provides definitions for the variables 
                                                 
19 I apply this restriction to avoid a small-denominator problem in variables scaled by stock price and to 
focus on economically significant stocks.   
20 To avoid the undue influence of extreme observations, I winsorize all continuous variables, except  
those related to stock returns, at the top and bottom one percent of their respective distributions.   
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used in the empirical tests.21  Figure 2 reports the relative timing of the key variables and 
also provides the average number of days between the various variable measurement 
dates.    
3.2. Descriptive Statistics    
Table 1, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the primary variables, as well 
as for the control variables used in the empirical tests.  Consistent with prior studies 
(Asquith and Meulbroek 1996; Dechow et al. 2001), I find that the distribution of the 
RSIratio is right-skewed, with mean and median shares sold short of 1.9% and 0.7% of 
shares outstanding, respectively.  The mean quarterly earnings per share is 0.8% of stock 
price and the median is 1.3% of stock price.  The mean consensus analyst forecast error 
is negative, suggesting that on average analysts are optimistic about future earnings.  The 
mean forecast revision is also negative, suggesting that analysts become more 
pessimistic as the earnings announcement date approaches.  Finally, 18% of the firms in 
the sample experience losses.      
Due to the large proportion of firms reporting low levels of short interest, I 
follow Dechow et al. (2001) and partition my sample into two sub-samples based on the 
magnitude of the RSIratio.  I classify all firm-quarter observations with more than 0.5% 
of the outstanding shares sold short as ―high short interest‖ firms and all firm-quarter 
observations with less than 0.5% of the outstanding shares sold short as ―low short 
interest‖ firms.   Observations in the high short interest sample are further grouped into 
10 portfolios based on the rank of the RSIratio in the current fiscal quarter.  I label the  
                                                 
21 All per-share data are adjusted for stock splits using the COMPUSTAT adjustment factor [data17].    
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FIGURE 2 
Timing of Variable Measurement 
 
 
 
 
________________ 
Short Int. Measurement Date is the date that the stock exchanges compile short interest data and generally falls on the 15th day of the month; Short Int. 
Public. Date is the date that short interest data is released to the public, which generally occurs 4 (8) days after the Short Int. Measurement Date for 
NYSE and AMEX (NASDAQ) firms; End Date is the fiscal quarter-end date; RDQE is the report date of quarterly earnings as reported by 
COMPUSTAT;  Last Analyst Forecast is the date of the last consensus analyst forecast of earnings per share as reported by I/B/E/S; and First Analyst 
Forecast is the date of the first consensus analyst forecast of earnings per share after the prior quarter’s earnings announcement as reported by I/B/E/S. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive statistics for the primary and control variables 
 
Primary Variables     
  Mean Std. Dev. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
RSI Ratio 0.019 0.035 0.001 0.007 0.021 
EPS 0.008 0.025 0.004 0.013 0.020 
ΔEPS -0.001 0.021 -0.004 0.002 0.004 
LFEPS 0.010 0.021 0.005 0.013 0.020 
FE -0.001 0.010 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
FREV -0.002 0.007 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
ABRET6 0.008 0.414 -0.218 -0.031 0.163 
      
Control Variables     
  Mean Std. Dev. 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
MVE 1,507 3,907 113 328 1,011 
LnMVE 5.91 1.60 4.73 5.79 6.92 
BTM 0.58 0.40 0.30 0.49 0.74 
LnBTM -0.78 0.72 -1.20 -0.71 -0.30 
RET 0.175 0.762 -0.215 0.069 0.379 
LOSS 0.18 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ANAFOL 4 4 2 3 6 
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
Panel B:  Mean and median relative short interest ratios for portfolios formed based on 
the magnitude of the relative short interest ratio. 
 
    RSI Ratio  MVE  BTM 
 
RSI 
Port. 
RSIdec N Mean Med.  Mean Med.  Mean Med. 
            
Low  
Short Interest  
0 0.0 40,039 0.002 0.001   779 160   0.64 0.56 
            
High  
Short Interest  1 0.1 5,007 0.006 0.006  2,365 436  0.55 0.47 
 2 0.2 5,041 0.008 0.008  2,803 535  0.53 0.45 
 3 0.3 5,049 0.010 0.010  2,512 586  0.52 0.45 
 4 0.4 5,044 0.013 0.013  2,467 629  0.51 0.43 
 5 0.5 5,034 0.017 0.016  2,173 652  0.51 0.43 
 6 0.6 5,050 0.022 0.021  2,044 643  0.51 0.42 
 7 0.7 5,051 0.029 0.028  1,824 636  0.50 0.40 
 8 0.8 5,042 0.040 0.039  1,678 591  0.47 0.38 
 9 0.9 5,048 0.061 0.060  1,534 540  0.47 0.35 
 10 1.0 5,022 0.132 0.114  983 452  0.46 0.34 
   90,427         
 
 
________________ 
The descriptives statistics are based on 90,427 firm-quarter observations for all variables except ΔEPS, 
which is based on 71,106 firm-quarter observations.   Firm-quarters with less than 0.5% of outstanding 
shares sold short are grouped into a single portfolio, labeled the Low Short Interest Sample.   Firm-quarters 
with more than 0.5% of outstanding shares sold short are included in the High Short Interes Sample and 
are grouped into ten portfolios, based on the magnitude of the RSIratio.  RSIdec is the decile ranking, 
scaled to range between [0, 1]. 
 
 
 
ranked variable RSIdec.  Because the RSI ratios for observations in the low short interest 
sample exhibit little cross-sectional variation, all observations in this sample are grouped 
into a single portfolio which takes an RSIdec value of 0.  For the empirical tests, I scale 
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RSIdec to range between 0 and 1 (as opposed to 0 and 10).  This transformation 
facilitates the interpretation of the coefficient on RSIdec in the regression analyses.22   
Table 1, Panel B presents the number of observations for each portfolio of 
RSIdec and provides the mean and median values for the RSI ratio, the market value of 
equity, and the book-to-market value ratio across portfolios.  In the low short interest 
sample, the mean RSIratio is 0.2%.  In the high short interest sample, the lowest and 
highest portfolios have a mean RSIratio of 0.6% and 13.2%, respectively.  With respect 
to the relationship between portfolios of RSI ratios and firm size, I find that firms in the 
extreme portfolios (i.e., portfolios 0 and 10) are smaller on average than firms in the 
middle portfolios.  However, during the sample period the median firm size in the 
COMPUSTAT universe is $178 million, which is similar to the median firm size of $160 
million in RSI portfolio 0 and less than the median firm size of $452 million in RSI 
portfolio 10.23  This suggests that the extreme portfolios are not primarily composed of 
small firms.  Finally, I find a clear, negative association between the magnitude of the 
RSI ratio and the book-to-market ratio.  This is consistent with evidence presented in 
Dechow et al. (2001) that short-sellers target firms with relatively low book-to-market 
ratios (i.e., glamour firms).24   
                                                 
22 In untabulated sensitivity tests, I find that the results are not sensitive to this portfolio approach.  
Specifically, I re-estimate each empirical model using the continuous RSI ratio, and after omitting all  
low short interest firms or those with firms RSI ratios of zero.  I find that all results are qualitatively 
similar to those reported using the portfolio approach.   
23 I determined the median firm size using all firms in COMPUSTAT from the NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ exchanges with stock prices greater than 1 dollar and data available to calculate year-end 
market value of equity.  
24 I control for size and book-to-market in all of the empirical tests to follow.   
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Before proceeding to the main empirical models and tests of hypothesis, I 
investigate the stability of the RSI ratio over time.  Table 2, Panel A presents a transition 
matrix for changes in RSI portfolios between consecutive quarters.  For firms in the high 
short interest sample, I combine the portfolios (effectively creating quintiles) for ease of 
exposition.  The values in the matrix are stated in terms of percentages, such that the 
sum of the percentages across each row is 100%.25  It is evident from examining the 
concentrations on the diagonal-cells that the tendency is for firms to remain in a similar 
RSI portfolio over the next quarter.  The concentrations within the diagonal-cells are 
also greater at the extremes.  Specifically, more than 70% of the firms in the lowest and 
highest two portfolios of RSI ratios remain in the same portfolio in the next quarter.  I 
also find that large changes in RSI ratios occur relatively infrequently.  Approximately 
1% of firms move from the highest to the lowest portfolios, and vice versa.   
In Table 2, Panel B, I present the transition matrix for RSI portfolio changes two-
quarters-ahead.  The evidence is consistent with Panel A in that concentrations are 
observed on the diagonal-cells; however, as would be expected the magnitudes of the 
concentrations are lower than those reported in Panel A (i.e., changes are more likely as 
the change horizon increases).    
                                                 
25 To illustrate, cell (0,0) can be interpreted as follows:  78% of the firms in the lowest short interest 
portfolio in quarter t, remain in the lowest short interest portfolio in quarter t+1.   
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TABLE 2 
Transition Matrix for Changes in Short Interest Portfolio 
Membership over the Next Two Quarters 
 
Panel A:  Percentage of instances when a firm changes RSI portfolio membership 
between the current quarter and next quarter. 
 
 
  TO (RSI portfolio in quarter t + 1) 
FROM 
(RSI 
portfolio in 
quarter t) 
 0 1 & 2 3 & 4 5 & 6 7 & 8 9 & 10 Missing 
0 78% 8% 4% 2% 1% 1% 7% 
1 & 2 27% 35% 19% 7% 3% 1% 8% 
3 & 4 12% 18% 35% 19% 6% 2% 7% 
5 & 6 5% 7% 19% 39% 19% 4% 7% 
7 & 8 3% 2% 6% 19% 48% 15% 7% 
9 & 10 1% 1% 2% 3% 15% 70% 8% 
 
Panel B:  Percentage of instances when a firm changes RSI portfolio membership 
between the current quarter and two-quarters-ahead. 
 
  TO (RSI portfolio in quarter t + 2) 
FROM 
(RSI 
portfolio in 
quarter t) 
 0 1 & 2 3 & 4 5 & 6 7 & 8 9 & 10 Missing 
0 67% 8% 5% 3% 2% 1% 14% 
1 & 2 27% 25% 17% 9% 5% 2% 15% 
3 & 4 15% 17% 25% 17% 9% 3% 15% 
5 & 6 8% 9% 18% 28% 18% 6% 14% 
7 & 8 4% 4% 8% 18% 34% 17% 14% 
9 & 10 2% 1% 3% 6% 16% 56% 16% 
 
 
________________ 
RSI Porfolios of the high short interest sample are combined for parsimony.  The sum of the percentages 
across each row is 100%.   
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Overall, the results presented in Table 2 suggest that extreme magnitudes of short 
interest (either high or low) are fairly stable over time and that large changes in short 
interest are relatively rare.  This is relevant for investors and for my empirical tests 
because it suggests that short-sellers’ expectations of low returns that are implicit in high 
RSI ratios do not dissipate over just one fiscal quarter.  
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4. EMPIRICAL MODELS AND RESULTS 
 In this section, I present the empirical models, main hypothesis tests, and tests of 
practical implications of my analysis for investors.  Each of the regression models 
described below is estimated by fiscal-quarter using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
estimation procedure to control for cross-sectional correlation.26  I assess the statistical 
significance of the associations using t-tests based on the time-series means and standard 
errors from the quarterly regressions.  I also report the number of times the coefficient in 
the quarterly regressions is positive or negative and calculate a one-way χ2 statistic to 
test the observed percentage of positive or negative coefficients (depending on the 
predicted sign) against the null hypothesis that the percentage is equal to 50%.    
4.1. The Incremental Information Content of Short Interest for Future Earnings beyond 
Analyst Forecasts 
 In this section of the dissertation, I address my first research question by 
investigating whether information in short interest is useful for predicting future earnings 
beyond the information available in analyst earnings forecasts.   
4.1.1. Univariate Tests 
I begin by examining future accounting profitability measures across RSI ratio 
portfolios.  I plot this relation in Figure 3, and find that quarter-one earnings per share 
levels decrease nearly monotonically across the portfolios.  The results for the 
                                                 
26 Another potential concern is time-series correlation resulting from a firm-effect.  As a robustness test, I 
re-estimate the models and compute Roger’s standard errors (Rogers 1993), allowing the residuals to 
cluster by firm.  All results (untabulated) are qualitatively similar to the Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
estimation results reported in the tables.   
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FIGURE 3 
Mean and Median Future Accounting Profitability across Relative Short Interest Ratio Portfolios 
 
Quarter-one 
    
 
Quarter-two 
    
________________ 
Firm-quarters with less than 0.5% of outstanding shares sold short are grouped into portfolio 0.  Firm-quarters with more than 0.5% of outstanding 
shares sold short are grouped into portfolios 1 – 10 based on the magnitude of the RSIratio.   
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quarter-one change in earnings per share are mixed.  The median change in earnings per 
share is positive in each portfolio and the magnitudes are relatively stable across the 
portfolios.  However, the mean change in earnings per share is negative in all but one 
portfolio, and generally becomes more negative across the relative short interest 
portfolios.  Figure 3 also reveals that firms with high RSIratios have a greater incidence 
of losses in quarter-one than firms with low RSIratios.  The results for quarter-two 
earnings per share, changes in earnings per share, and losses are qualitatively similar to 
the results for quarter-one.  Together, these results provide preliminary evidence that the 
RSIratio is negatively associated with accounting profitability realized over the next two 
fiscal quarters.   
4.1.2. Multivariate Tests Using Quarter-one Earnings 
In this sub-section, I investigate the association between RSIdec and earnings 
levels or changes after controlling for the information in the last consensus analyst 
forecast of earnings and various other control variables.  I examine earnings levels to 
investigate whether short interest contains information about the cross-section of future 
accounting profitability.  That is, I test whether higher (lower) levels of short interest are 
associated with lower (higher) future earnings performance.  However, differences in 
earnings performance across levels of short interest might be long-standing; thus, I also 
examine whether levels of short interest are negatively associated with future earnings 
changes.  This test allows me to infer whether short interest contains information about 
future earnings innovations.  Specifically, I estimate the following models in quarter-
one:   
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EPSt = β0 + β1 RSIdect + β2 EPSt-1 + β3 RETt-1 + β4 LnMVEt-1 + β5 LnBTMt-1  
+ β6 LFEPSt + ε       (1) 
and 
ΔEPSt = δ0 + δ1 RSIdect + δ2 ΔEPSt-1 + δ3 RETt-1 + δ4 LnMVEt-1 + δ5 LnBTMt-1  
+ δ6 LFΔEPSt + ε,        (2) 
 
where:   
 
t = Quarter indicator; 
 
EPS = Quarterly earnings per share as reported by I/B/E/S, scaled by the stock 
price at the beginning of the quarter [COMPUSTAT data14]; 
 
ΔEPS =  Seasonal change in quarterly earnings per share, measured as earnings in 
the current less earnings in the same quarter one year prior, scaled by the 
stock price at the beginning of the quarter;  
 
RSIdec =  Decile ranking of the relative short interest ratio (number of shares sold 
short / number of shares outstanding) for the last month in the quarter.  
For firms with less than 0.5% of the outstanding shares sold short, RSIdec 
is set equal to 0.  Firms with more than 0.5% of the outstanding shares 
sold short are grouped into deciles based on the magnitude of the 
RSIratio.  RSIdec is scaled to range between [0, 1]; 
 
RET =  Raw buy-and-hold return measured as the realized monthly return 
cumulated over the twelve-month period ending on the quarter-end date; 
 
LnMVE =  Natural log of the market value of equity [COMPUSTAT data14 x 
COMPUSTAT data61];  
 
LnBTM =  Natural log of the book-to-market ratio [COMPUSTAT data59 / 
(COMPUSTAT data14 x COMPUSTAT data61)]; 
 
LFEPS = Last consensus analyst forecast for quarterly earnings per share as 
reported by I/B/E/S, scaled by the beginning of quarter stock price 
[COMPUSTAT data14]; and 
 
LFΔEPS =  Last consensus analyst forecast for quarterly earnings per share as 
reported by I/B/E/S less earnings per share in the same quarter one year 
prior, scaled by the beginning of quarter stock price [COMPUSTAT 
data14]. 
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In models (1) and (2), I test whether short interest is negatively associated with 
earnings levels and changes (β1 < 0 and that δ1 < 0, respectively).  Significantly negative 
coefficients on RSIdec would be consistent with H1 and indicate that the relative short 
interest ratio contains information that is useful for predicting earnings, beyond the 
information available in the analyst earnings forecast.  I control for the information in 
prior period earnings about quarter-one earnings by including lagged EPS and lagged 
ΔEPS as independent variables in models (1) and (2) respectively.  I control for the 
information in prior returns about earnings by including the buy-and-hold raw stock 
return for a one-year period ending in the prior quarter.    
The market value of equity (size) and the book-to-market ratio are included as 
control variables for two reasons.  First, prior studies find that short-sellers target large 
firms with low book-to-market ratios (i.e., glamour firms) (Dechow et al. 2001; Desai et 
al. 2007).  Therefore, it is important to control for these variables to rule out the 
possibility that my variable of interest, RSIdec, is merely acting as a proxy for size 
and/or book-to-market.  Second, prior studies find that size and book-to-market ratios 
are systematically related to future profitability (Fama and French 1995).  Thus, the 
exclusion of these control variables would result in a correlated omitted variables 
problem.  Finally, I control for analyst’ earnings forecasts by including the last 
consensus analyst earnings forecast before earnings are announced as an independent 
variable in model (1) and by including the forecasted seasonal change in earnings 
implied by the last consensus analyst earnings forecast as an independent variable in 
model (2).   
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 Table 3 presents estimation results for models (1) and (2) in quarter-one.  In 
Panel A, I report results without analyst forecasts in the model so that I can investigate 
whether the coefficient on RSIdec changes (i.e., is the information in RSI ratios 
subsumed?) when analyst forecasts are entered into the model.  In model (1) the mean 
coefficient on RSIdec is negative and statistically significant (β1 = -0.0038; p-value < 
0.01).  In addition, I find that the coefficient on RSIdec is negative in 60 of the 61 
quarterly regressions.  This allows rejection of the null hypothesis that the percentage of 
negative coefficients is 50% (χ2 = 57.07; p-value < 0.01).  The magnitude of the 
coefficient on RSIdec provides an indication of the economic significance of the results.  
Recall that RSIdec is scaled to range between zero (firms with the lowest relative short 
interest ratios) and one (firms with the highest short interest ratios) and that the 
dependent variable, EPSt, is scaled by stock price.  Thus, on average, earnings per share 
is lower by 0.38% of stock price for the firms with the highest RSI ratios relative to 
firms with the lowest RSI ratios.  If I assume a stock price of $20, this percentage 
represents a $0.076 difference in earnings per share.  This difference in earnings per 
share is economically significant given that earnings per share as a percentage of stock 
price for the median firm in the sample is 1.30% (see Table 1, Panel A), which at a stock 
price of $20 implies median earnings of $0.26. I also find that prior-period earnings, 
returns, and lagged firm size are all positively and significantly associated with quarter-
one earnings levels.   
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TABLE 3 
The Association between Short Interest and Quarter-One Earnings  
with and without Controlling for Analyst Forecasts 
 
Model (1):  EPSt = β0 + β1 RSIdect + β2 EPSt-1 + β3 RETt-1 + β4 LnMVEt-1 + β5 LnBTMt-1 + β6 LFEPSt + ε   
Model (2):  ΔEPSt = δ0 + δ1 RSIdect + δ2 ΔEPSt-1 + δ3 RETt-1 + δ4 LnMVEt-1 + δ5 LnBTMt-1 + δ6 LFΔEPSt + ε   
Panel A:  Without Controlling for Analyst Forecasts 
 
 Model (1)  Model (2) 
Variable 
Mean 
(Coef) t-stat  
#Pos 
(#Neg)  
Mean 
(Coef) t-stat  
#Pos 
(#Neg) 
Intercept -0.0039 -5.23 *** 18(43)  -0.0021 -4.06 *** 15(46) 
RSIdec -0.0038 -10.64 *** 1(60)  -0.0029 -6.94 *** 3(58) 
EPSt-1 0.6519 32.78 *** 0(61)      
ΔEPSt-1      0.5076 22.55 *** 0(61) 
RETt-1 0.0021 8.03 *** 57(4)  0.0019 6.50 *** 54(7) 
LnMVEt-1 0.0014 13.79 *** 61(0)  0.0002 2.16 ** 39(22) 
LnBTMt-1 0.0004 1.51  38(23)  -0.0016 -7.28 *** 8(53) 
LFEPSt          
LFΔEPSt          
          
Firms (Ave.) 1,482     1,165    
R2 (Ave.) 0.41     0.25    
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TABLE 3 (Continued) 
Panel B:  With Controlling for Analyst Forecasts 
 
 
 Model (1)  Model (2) 
Variable 
Mean 
(Coef) t-stat  
#Pos 
(#Neg)  
Mean 
(Coef) t-stat  
#Pos 
(#Neg) 
Intercept -0.0069 -15.24 *** 0(61)  -0.0056 -11.56 *** 2(59) 
RSIdec -0.0012 -3.98 *** 17(44)  -0.0016 -5.94 *** 10(51) 
EPSt-1 0.1214 11.64 *** 60(1)      
ΔEPSt-1      0.1138 13.28 *** 58(3) 
RETt-1 0.0010 6.28 *** 50(11)  0.0015 5.89 *** 52(9) 
LnMVEt-1 0.0006 13.91 *** 59(2)  0.0006 11.34 *** 58(3) 
LnBTMt-1 -0.0017 -7.60 *** 6(55)  -0.0010 -5.54 *** 12(49) 
LFEPSt 0.9554 79.70 *** 61(0)      
LFΔEPSt      0.9070 97.84 *** 61(0) 
          
Firms (Ave.) 1,482     1,165    
R2 (Ave.) 0.73     0.70    
 
 
________________ 
*, **, *** indicates significant at the p < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level respectively.  See Appendix A for variable definitions.  The number of firms and R2 
reported are the averages across the quarterly cross-sectional regressions.   
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The results are similar when the change in earnings is the dependent variable 
(Panel A, model (2)).  The mean coefficient on RSIdec is negative and statistical 
significant (δ1 = -0.0029; p-value < 0.01) and is negative in 58 of the 61 quarterly 
regressions (χ2 = 49.59; p-value < 0.01).  This suggests that on average, the change in 
earnings per share is lower by 0.29% of stock price for the firms with the highest RSI 
ratios relative to firms with the lowest RSI ratios.  At an assumed stocked price of $20, 
this percentage implies that the change in earnings per share is $0.058 lower, which is 
economically significant given that, at a stock price of $20, the median firm reports an 
implied change in earnings per share of $0.04.     
Next, I re-estimate models (1) and (2) controlling for the information in analyst 
forecast.  Table 3, Panel B presents the estimation results. Consistent with H1, the 
RSIdec coefficient in model (1) remains negative and statistically significant (β1 = -
0.0012; p-value < 0.01) and the coefficient is negative in 44 of the 61 quarterly 
regressions (χ2 = 11.95; p-value < 0.01).  However, the magnitude of the negative 
coefficient on RSIdec when the consensus analyst forecast is included as a control (β1 = -
0.0012), is less than half as large as the magnitude of the negative coefficient on RSIdec 
when the consensus analyst forecast is excluded as a control (β1 = -0.0038).  This 
reduction in the magnitude of the coefficient suggests that some, but not all, of the 
information in the relative short interest ratio is reflected in the consensus analyst 
forecast.   
In Panel B, model (2), I find that the mean coefficient on RSIdec is negative and 
statistical significant (δ1 = -0.0016; p-value < 0.01) and the coefficient is negative in 51 
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of the 61 quarterly regressions (χ2 = 27.56; p-value < 0.01), which is consistent with H1.  
The magnitude of the negative coefficient on RSIdec in model (2), after controlling for 
analyst forecasts, is less than the magnitude of the negative coefficient on RSIdec in 
model (2) which does not control for analyst forecasts (see Panel A).   
In untabulated tests, I also find that the average coefficient on RSIdec (δ1 = -
0.0016) in Model (2), which explains earnings changes, is significantly greater than the 
average coefficient on RSIdec (β1 = -0.0012) in Model (1), which explains earnings 
levels.  This suggests that short interest levels contain substantial information about 
earnings innovations.   
4.1.3. Multivariate Tests Using Quarter-two Earnings 
Prior literature finds that changes in prices generally lead changes in earnings 
(Collins et al. 1987; Warfield and Wild 1992).  In this sub-section, I investigate whether 
the association between RSI ratios and earnings extends to longer earnings horizon (i.e., 
two earnings announcements ahead), by estimating the following models using quarter-
two earnings: 
EPSt+1 = λ0 + λ1 RSIdect + λ2 EPSt + λ3 RETt + λ4 LnMVEt + λ5 LnBTMt  
+ λ6 LFEPSt+1 + ε       (3) 
and 
ΔEPSt+1 = α0 + α1 RSIdect + α2 ΔEPSt + α3 RETt + α4 LnMVEt + α5 LnBTMt  
+ α6 LFΔEPSt+1 + ε,       (4) 
where all variables and subscripts are defined previously.     
In models (3) and (4), I test whether short interest is negatively associated with 
quarter-two earnings levels and changes (λ1 < 0 and α1 < 0 respectively).  Table 4, Panels 
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A and B presents the estimation results of models (3) and (4) with and without controls 
for analyst forecasts.  In all models I find that RSIdec is negatively and significantly 
associated with quarter-two earnings regardless of whether analyst forecast information 
is included in the model.  Consistent with H1, in Panel B, I find that RSIdec is negatively 
and significantly associated with quarter-two earnings levels (λ1 = -0.0011; p-value < 
0.01) and changes (α1 = -0.0014; p-value < 0.01), controlling for information from 
analysts.  The percentage of negative coefficients on RSIdec is also significantly 
different than 50% for both models.   
The estimation results reported in Tables 3 and 4 reveal that the magnitudes of 
the coefficients on RSIdec using quarter-one earnings (models (1) and (2)) are similar to 
the magnitudes of the coefficient on RSIdec using quarter-two earnings (models (3) and 
(4)).   In untabulated tests, I find that the average coefficient on the RSI ratio in model 
(1) of -0.0012 (reported in Table 3, Panel B) using quarter-one earnings levels is not 
significantly different than the average coefficient on the RSI ratio in model (3) of -
0.0011 (reported in Table 4, Panel B) using quarter-two earnings levels.  Similarly, I find 
that the average coefficient on the RSI ratio in model (2) of -0.0016 (reported in Table 3, 
Panel B) using quarter-one earnings changes is not significantly different than the 
average coefficient on the RSI ratio in model (4) of -0.0014 (reported in Table 4, Panel 
B) using quarter-two earnings changes.  
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TABLE 4 
The Association between Short Interest and Quarter-Two Earnings  
with and without Controlling for Analyst Forecasts 
 
Model (3):  EPSt+1 = λ0 + λ1 RSIdect + λ2 EPSt + λ3 RETt + λ4 LnMVEt + λ5 LnBTMt + λ6 LFEPSt+1 + ε   
Model (4):  ΔEPSt+1 = α0 + α1 RSIdect + α2 ΔEPSt + α3 RETt + α4 LnMVEt + α5 LnBTMt + α6 LFΔEPSt+1 + ε  
Panel A:  Without Controlling for Analyst Forecasts 
 
 Model (3)  Model (4) 
Variable 
Mean 
(Coef) t-stat  
#Pos 
(#Neg)  
Mean 
(Coef) t-stat  
#Pos 
(#Neg) 
Intercept -0.0065 -8.55 *** 9(52)  -0.0022 -3.20 *** 17(44) 
RSIdec -0.0043 -10.51 *** 4(57)  -0.0024 -5.42 *** 10(51) 
EPSt 0.6724 33.34 *** 61(0)      
ΔEPSt      0.4978 22.66 *** 60(1) 
RETt 0.0029 6.43 *** 57(4)  0.0019 5.73 *** 49(12) 
LnMVEt 0.0017 18.37 *** 61(0)  0.0001 1.27  39(22) 
LnBTMt 0.0002 0.71  34(27)  -0.0019 -6.82 *** 10(51) 
LFEPSt+1          
LFΔEPSt+1          
          
Firms (Ave.) 1,482     1,165    
R2 (Ave.) 0.42     0.25    
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TABLE 4 (Continued) 
Panel B:  With Controlling for Analyst Forecasts 
 
 
 Model (3)  Model (4) 
Variable 
Mean 
(Coef) t-stat  
#Pos 
(#Neg)  
Mean 
(Coef) t-stat  
#Pos 
(#Neg) 
Intercept -0.0096 -15.02 *** 0(61)  -0.0075 -13.68 *** 1(60) 
RSIdec -0.0011 -3.82 *** 19(42)  -0.0014 -4.35 *** 10(51) 
EPSt-1 0.1704 14.29 *** 60(1)      
ΔEPSt-1      0.1477 11.80 *** 60(1) 
RETt-1 0.0015 5.86 *** 53(8)  0.0018 6.07 *** 56(5) 
LnMVEt-1 0.0009 14.05 *** 61(0)  0.0009 12.78 *** 59(2) 
LnBTMt-1 -0.0021 -8.84 *** 2(59)  -0.0012 -6.35 *** 11(50) 
LFEPSt 0.9255 87.52 *** 61(0)      
LFΔEPSt      0.8674 72.12 *** 61(0) 
          
Firms (Ave.) 1,482     1,165    
R2 (Ave.) 0.70     0.65    
 
 
________________ 
*, **, *** indicates significant at the p < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level respectively.  See Table 1 for variable definitions.  The number of firms and R2 reported 
are the averages across the quarterly cross-sectional regressions.   
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Thus, I find evidence that the association between short interest and earnings extends up 
to two earnings announcements ahead, and appears to be unchanged as the earnings 
horizon is extended by one quarter.  This suggests that short interest levels reflect 
information that is gradually realized in earnings over multiple reporting periods.    
In sum, the results presented in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with H1.  They 
suggest that the relative short interest ratio contains information about earnings realized 
over the next two quarterly earnings announcements and that the consensus analyst 
reflects some, but not all, of this information.   
4.2. Assessing Analyst Efficiency with Respect to Short Interest 
 
4.2.1. Tests of the Association between Short Interest and Analyst Forecast Errors 
In this sub-section, I examine the association between short interest and quarter-
one or quarter-two analyst forecast errors.  The models presented next follow a long line 
of empirical research that examines analyst efficiency with respect to an available signal 
by estimating the association between the publicly available signal and subsequent 
analyst forecast errors (e.g., Abarbanell 1991; Abarbanell and Bernard 1992; 
Mendenhall 1991; Bradshaw et al. 2001).  I estimate the following models:  
FEt = ψ0 + ψ1 RSIdect + ψ2 EPSt-1 + ψ3 RETt-1 + ψ4 LnMVEt-1 + ψ5 LnBTMt-1  
+ ψ6 LOSSt-1 + ε       (5) 
and 
FEt+1 = φ0 + φ1 RSIdect + φ2 EPSt + φ3 RETt + φ4 LnMVEt + φ5 LnBTMt  
+ φ6 LOSSt + ε,       (6) 
 
where:   
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FE = Analyst forecast error measured as EPS minus LFEPS, scaled by the 
beginning of quarter stock price [COMPUSTAT data14];  
 
LOSS = Indicator variable set equal to one if quarterly earnings per share as 
reported by I/B/E/S is negative, and zero otherwise; and 
 
All other variables and subscripts as defined previously.     
Models (5) and (6) investigate whether analyst forecasts fully reflect the 
information in short interest about future earnings.27  Specifically, in models (5) and (6), 
I test whether short interest is negatively associated with quarter-one and quarter-two 
analyst forecast errors (ψ1 < 0 and φ1 < 0 respectively).  A significantly negative 
coefficient on RSIdec in models (5) and (6) is consistent with an under-reaction to the 
information in RSIdec about future earnings.  Given that prior studies find that analysts 
under-react to the information in prior period earnings (Abarbanell and Bernard 1992) 
and prior period returns (Abarbanell 1991), I include those variables as controls.28  I also 
follow prior studies and control for other known determinants of analyst forecast errors.  
Specifically, I include firm size to control for the firm’s information environment (Das et 
                                                 
27 Since the dependent variable in models (5) and (6) is also a proxy for the earnings surprise, an 
alternative interpretation is that these models investigate whether short-sellers take positions in firms they 
expect to miss analyst earnings targets.  While my tests cannot rule out this possibility, my research design 
does require that the short interest information to be publicly available at the time the consensus analyst 
recommendation is measured.  On average, the short interest publication date is 25 days prior to the 
consensus analyst forecast date and 38 days prior to the earnings announcement (see Figure 2).  Therefore, 
analysts can observe the signal from the short-sellers and respond to that signal if they so choose.  Also, if 
short-sellers are primarily targeting firms they expect to miss analyst targets, it seems unlikely that they 
would take those positions (and assume the risk) so far in advance of the earnings announcement, 
especially since analysts revise their forecasts during this period.   
28 Consistent with the prior studies cited, I expect the coefficient on EPS and RET to both be positive, 
which would suggest that analysts under-react to these information sources. 
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al. 1998; Eames and Glover 2003), book-to-market to control for growth opportunities 
(Richardson et al. 2004), and prior-period losses (Ali et al. 1992).29   
Table 5, Panels A and B present the estimation results of model (5) and (6).  In 
Panel A, the mean coefficient on RSIdec in model (5) is negative and statistically 
significant (ψ1 = -0.0008; p-value < 0.01).  I find that the coefficient on RSIdec is 
negative in 45 of the 61 quarterly regressions (χ2 = 13.79; p-value < 0.01).  The 
magnitude of the coefficient suggests that, on average, the quarter-one analyst forecast 
error is lower by 0.08% of stock price for firms with the highest RSI ratio relative to 
firms with the lowest RSI ratio.  At an assumed stock price of $20, this percentage 
implies that the forecast error is $0.016 lower.  I also find that each of the control 
variables is associated with the quarter-one analyst forecast errors in the predicted 
direction.  
In Table 5, Panel B, the mean coefficient on RSIdec in model (6) is also negative 
and statistically significant (φ1 = -0.0007; p-value < 0.01).  I find that the coefficient on 
RSIdec is negative in 55 of the 61 quarterly regressions (χ2 = 39.36; p-value < 0.01).  
                                                 
29 Consistent with prior studies cited, I expect the coefficient on LnMVE to be positive because a higher 
quality information environment implies smaller (less negative) forecast errors.  I expect the coefficient on 
LnBTM to be negative because, on average, analysts are more optimistic about high book-to-market firms.  
I expect the coefficient on LOSS because, on average, analysts are more optimistic about loss firms 
relative to profit firms.    
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TABLE 5 
The Association between Short Interest and Quarter-One and Quarter-Two Forecast Errors     
Panel A:  Regression results for quarter-one forecast errors  
Model (5):  FEt = ψ0 + ψ1 RSIdect + ψ2 EPSt-1 + ψ3 RETt-1 + ψ4 LnMVEt-1 + ψ5 LnBTMt-1 + ψ6 LOSSt-1 + ε 
 Model (7):  FEt = ψ0 + ψ1 RSIdect + ψ2 EPSt-1 + ψ3 RETt-1 + ψ4 LnMVEt-1 + ψ5 LnBTMt-1  + ψ6 LOSSt-1  
    + ψ7 HIGHAFt + ψ8 (RSIdect x HIGHAFt) +  ε  
 Model (5)  Model (7) 
Variable Mean 
(Coef) 
t-stat   #Pos 
(#Neg) 
 Mean 
(Coef) 
t-stat   #Pos 
(#Neg) 
Intercept -0.0060 -14.65 *** 1(60)  -0.0059 -13.47 *** 3(58) 
RSIdec -0.0008 -4.01 *** 16(45)  -0.0012 -4.28 *** 17(44) 
EPSt-1 0.0704 13.28 *** 58(3)  0.0705 13.38 *** 58(3) 
RETt-1 0.0009 6.91 *** 51(10)  0.0009 7.16 *** 52(9) 
LnMVEt-1 0.0005 12.82 *** 58(3)  0.0005 9.26 *** 56(5) 
LnBTMt-1 -0.0014 -8.89 *** 4(57)  -0.0014 -8.82 *** 3(58) 
LOSSt-1 -0.0004 -1.51  29(32)  -0.0004 -1.42  32(29) 
HIGHAFt      0.0001 0.75  27(34) 
RSIdec x HIGHAFt      0.0007 2.42 ** 41(20) 
          
Firms (Ave.) 1,482     1,482    
R2 (Ave.) 0.06     0.06    
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TABLE 5 (Continued) 
Panel B:  Regression results for quarter-two forecast errors 
Model (6):  FEt+1 = φ0 + φ1 RSIdect + φ2 EPSt + φ3 RETt + φ4 LnMVEt + φ5 LnBTMt + φ6 LOSSt + ε 
 Model (8):  FEt+1 = φ0 + φ1 RSIdect + φ2 EPSt + φ3 RETt + φ4 LnMVEt + φ5 LnBTMt + φ6 LOSSt + φ7 HIGHAFt  
    + φ8 (RSIdect x HIGHAFt) +  ε  
  Model (6)  Model (8) 
Variable Mean 
(Coef) 
t-stat   #Pos 
(#Neg) 
 Mean 
(Coef) 
t-stat   #Pos 
(#Neg) 
Intercept -0.0084 -14.79 *** 0(61)  -0.0120 -16.72 *** 0(61) 
RSIdec -0.0007 -3.62 *** 6(55)  -0.0020 -5.30 *** 14(47) 
EPSt-1 0.0925 10.78 *** 59(2)  0.1257 14.37 *** 59(2) 
RETt-1 0.0013 7.17 *** 57(4)  0.0020 8.11 *** 55(6) 
LnMVEt-1 0.0008 14.68 *** 60(1)  0.0010 12.74 *** 59(2) 
LnBTMt-1 -0.0017 -8.77 *** 1(60)  -0.0026 -10.81 *** 1(60) 
LOSSt-1 -0.0006 -1.70 * 21(40)  -0.0011 -2.64 ** 22(39) 
HIGHAFt      -0.0001 -0.61  23(38) 
RSIdec x HIGHAFt      0.0009 2.09 ** 33(28) 
          
Firms (Ave.) 1,482     1,482    
R2 (Ave.) 0.08     0.10    
 
________________ 
*, **, *** indicates significant at the p < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level respectively.  See Table 1 for variable definitions.  The number of firms and R2 reported 
are the averages across the quarterly cross-sectional regressions.   
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The magnitude of the coefficient suggests that on average, the quarter-two analyst 
forecast error is lower by 0.07% of stock price for firms with the highest RSI ratios 
relative to firms with the lowest RSI ratios, which is economically significant.  Finally, 
in untabulated tests, I find that the average coefficient on RSIdec in model (6) is not 
significantly different from the average coefficient on RSIdec in model (5).   
The results presented in Table 5 provide evidence that analyst forecasts do not 
fully reflect the information in RSIratio about future earnings.  This suggests that 
analysts are inefficient with respect to earnings information contained in available short 
interest and implies that analysts are overly-optimistic about firms with high RSI ratios.   
4.2.2. Tests of the Association between RSI Ratios and Analyst Forecast Errors for High 
Versus Low Analyst Following 
Next, I investigate a condition under which I expect more of the information in 
RSIratio about future earnings to be embedded in analyst forecasts.  Pownall and Simko 
(2005) find that abnormal returns around short-spikes are significantly more negative for 
firms with low analyst following than for firms with high analyst following.  This 
implies that short-sellers play a less important role as information intermediaries when 
analyst following is high.  I test this implication by investigating whether analyst 
forecasts reflect significantly more of information in RSI ratios about future earnings for 
firms with high versus low analyst following using the following models:  
FEt = ψ0 + ψ1 RSIdect + ψ2 EPSt-1 + ψ3 RETt-1 + ψ4 LnMVEt-1 + ψ5 LnBTMt-1  
+ ψ6 LOSSt-1 +  ψ7 HIGHAFt + ψ8 (RSIdect x HIGHAFt) +  ε (7) 
and 
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FEt+1 = φ0 + φ1 RSIdect + φ2 EPSt + φ3 RETt + φ4 LnMVEt + φ5 LnBTMt  
+ φ6 LOSSt +  φ7 HIGHAFt + φ8 (RSIdect x HIGHAFt) +  ε,  (8) 
where:   
HIGHAF = Indicator variable set equal to one if the analyst following as reported by 
I/B/E/S is greater than the sample median of 3 analysts, and zero 
otherwise;30 and 
 
All other variables and subscripts as defined previously.     
 
In models (7) and (8), I add a control variable for the analyst following 
(HIGHAF) and the interaction (RSIdec x HIGHAF) to allow the coefficient on RSIdec to 
vary across levels of analyst following.  I expect the coefficients on the interactions, ψ8 
and φ8, to be positive, which would suggest that more of the earnings information in 
RSIdec is embedded into analyst forecasts when analyst following is high than when it is 
low.   
The results for quarter-one forecast errors are presented in Table 5, Panel A.  In 
model (7), I find that the mean coefficient on the interaction (RSIdec x HIGHAF) is 
positive and significant (ψ8 = 0.0007; p-value < 0.05).  The coefficient is positive in 41 
of the 61 quarterly regressions (χ2 = 7.23; p < 0.01), which allows me to reject the null 
hypothesis that the percentage of positive coefficients is 50%.   In untabulated tests, I 
find that the sum of the coefficients on RSIdec and (RSIdec x HIGHAF) is negative and 
significant (ψ1 + ψ8 = -0.0005; p-value < 0.05).  I find similar evidence for quarter-two 
forecast errors as presented in Panel B.  In model (8), I find that the mean coefficient on 
the interaction (RSIdec x HIGHAF) is positive and significant (φ8 = 0.0009; p-value < 
                                                 
30 In untabulated sensitivity tests, I re-estimate models (7) and (8) using decile rankings of the analyst 
following.  The results are qualitatively similar to those presented using the indicator variable approach.   
  
54 
0.05), but the coefficient is positive in only 33 of the 60 quarterly regressions (χ2 = 0.41; 
p-value > 0.10).  In untabulated tests, I also find that the sum of the coefficients on 
RSIdec and (RSIdec x HIGHAF) is negative and significant (φ1 + φ8 = -0.001; p-value < 
0.05).  Together, the results suggests that analyst forecasts are more efficient with 
respect to short interest information when the analyst following is high than when it is 
low and that the information in short interest is not fully reflected in returns even for 
firms with high analyst following.31  Thus, these analyses extend Pownall and Simko 
(2005) by providing evidence that short-sellers play an especially important role as 
earnings-information intermediaries when analyst following is low.   
4.3. Adjusting Analyst Forecasts for Short Interest 
 The results presented thus far are consistent with H1.  In this sub-section, I 
investigate a practical implication of these results for investors.  Specifically, the results 
imply that analyst forecasts can be improved (i.e., made less biased and more accurate) 
by adjusting for information in short interest about future earnings.  I test this 
implication by examining whether the historic association between RSI ratios and 
analyst forecast error can be used to reduce forecast error and squared-error.  For the 
high short interest sample, I adjust analyst forecast with short interest information using 
                                                 
31 Prior research finds that analyst following is positively associated with the information environment of 
the firms (O’Brien and Bhushan 1990).  Thus, an alternative explanation for this result is that HIGHAF is 
merely acting as an indicator of the quality or level of the information environment. In untabulated tests, I 
examine this alternative by interacting RSIdec with the decile ranking of firm size, which is another 
common proxy for the firm’s information environment.  I find that the average coefficient on RSIdec 
remains negative and significant and the average coefficient on the interaction term RSIdec x HIGHAF 
remains positive and significant.  I also find that the average coefficient on the interaction of RSIdec and 
firm size is insignificantly different from zero.  Thus, the finding that analyst forecasts are more efficient 
with respect to short interest information when the analyst following is high than when it is low is not 
related to differences in the information environment reflected in firm size.   
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the following procedure.  First, I estimate the following model separately for each fiscal 
quarter: 
FEt = ω0 + ω1 RSIdect + ε,       (9) 
where all variables and subscripts are defined previously.   
Second, I predict the analyst forecast error for the next fiscal quarter using the estimated 
coefficients from model (7) and the firm’s next-quarter RSI decile.  I then adjust the 
consensus earnings forecast by the predicted forecast error.  For example, I estimate 
model (7) using data from 2000-Q1 and use the estimated ω0 and ω1 coefficients to adjust 
the consensus analyst forecast in 2000-Q2.   
Table 6 reports the results of the adjustments to analyst forecasts using the 
mechanical procedure just described.  I find that the unadjusted forecasts produce an 
average forecast error of -0.14% of stock price and the adjusted forecasts produce an 
average forecast error of -0.02% of stock price.32  The reduction in error due to the 
adjustment of 0.12% is statistically significant (t-stat = 5.72; p-value < 0.01).  I also find 
that the unadjusted mean forecasts is significantly different from zero in 50 of 60 
quarters and that after the adjustment, this number is reduced by more than half to 24 of 
60 quarters.33  Finally, I find that the mean squared error is significantly lower for the 
adjusted forecasts relative to the unadjusted forecasts (t-stat = 3.07; p-value < 0.01).  
These results demonstrate the potential for reducing bias and increasing accuracy by 
adjusting analyst forecast for short interest information.    
                                                 
32 In an untabulated tests, I find that the adjusted forecast error is not significant different than zero. 
33 The number of quarters drops from 61 to 60 due to my use of lagged coefficients to adjust the analyst 
forecasts.   
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TABLE 6 
Comparisons of Error and Squared-Error of Unadjusted Analyst Forecasts to 
Forecasts Adjusted with Short Interest Information. 
 
    
Unadjusted 
Forecasts   
Adjusted 
Forecasts   
Reduction 
in Error 
t-stat 
(χ2)  
         
Mean error as a percent of 
stock price  -0.14%  -0.02%  0.12% 5.72 *** 
         
# of quarters with mean 
error significantly 
(insignificantly) different 
from zero  50(10)  24(36)     
         
Mean squared error as a 
percent of stock price * 
100  0.0191  0.0185  0.0006 3.07 *** 
         
# of quarters with lower 
(higher) squared error      45(15) 
          
(15.00) *** 
 
 
 
________________ 
*, **, *** indicates significant at the p < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level respectively.  The unadjusted (raw) analyst 
forecasts are adjusted using the following procedure.  I estimate model (7) separately for each fiscal 
quarter:  LFEt = ω0 + ω1 RSIdec + ε.  I predict the analyst forecast error for the next fiscal quarter using 
the estimated coefficients ω0 and ω1 and the firm’s next-quarter RSI decile.  I then adjust the consensus 
earnings forecast by the predicted forecast error.   
The mean error (EPS – forecasted EPS) and squared error (EPS – forecasted EPS)2 for the unadjusted and 
adjusted forecasts are based on the time-series of 61 quarterly measures using the High Short Interest 
Sample (N = 50,388).  The reduction in error is calucated as the mean quarterly difference between the 
unadjusted and adjusted error and squared error.   
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4.4. The Incremental Information Content of Analyst Forecast Revisions for Future 
Returns beyond Short Interest 
 4.4.1. Multivariate Tests  
 In this section of the dissertation, I address my second research question by 
investigating whether analyst earnings forecast revisions contain information that is 
useful for predicting future abnormal returns beyond the information available in short 
interest.  I measure abnormal returns as the realized daily return cumulated over the 
period beginning the day after the last consensus earnings forecast date and ending 180 
days later (approximately six-months) minus the corresponding value-weighted market 
return for the same period. 34,35  I begin the return accumulation period the day after the 
last consensus forecast date so that the RSI ratio and analyst forecast revision 
information is available at the time the position is taken (see Figure 2).  I label the 
resulting market-adjusted, buy-and-hold return ABRET6. 
I investigate the association between analyst forecast revisions and future 
abnormal returns using the following model:   
ABRET6t = θ0 + θ1 FREVt + θ2 RETt + θ3 LnMVEt + θ4 LnBTMt  
   + θ6 RSIdect + ε      (10) 
 
where:   
 
ABRET6 = Market-adjusted buy-and-hold return for the six-month period beginning 
the day after the forecast revision date; 
 
                                                 
34 If a firm delists during the return accumulation period, I compound the delisting return with the buy-
and-hold return and assume the liquidating proceeds are reinvested in the market portfolio (i.e., the 
abnormal return is zero) for the remainder of the return accumulation period.  
35 The results are qualitatively similar using return windows of 90- days.   
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FFEPS = First consensus analyst forecast for quarterly earnings per share issued 
after the prior quarter’s earnings announcement, scaled by the beginning 
of quarter stock price [COMPUSTAT data14]; 
 
FREV =  Analyst forecast revision measured as LFEPS minus FFEPS, scaled by 
the beginning of quarter stock price [COMPUSTAT data14]; and 
 
all other variables and subscripts as defined previously. 
In model (10), I test whether the analyst forecast revision is positively associated 
with future abnormal returns (θ1 > 0).  A significantly positive coefficient on FREV is 
consistent with H2, which posits that forecast revisions contain information that is useful 
for predicting returns beyond the information available in short interest.  I expect a 
negative coefficient on RSIdec (θ6 < 0), consistent with the finding that short interest 
levels are negatively associated with future abnormal returns (e.g., Asquith and 
Meulbroek 1996; Dechow et al. 2001; Desai et al. 2002; Asquith et al. 2005).   I include 
momentum, size and book-to-market to control for risk factors known to predict 
abnormal returns (Fama and French 1992, 1995; Carhart 1997). 
In Table 7, I first present the estimation results for model (10) without 
controlling for the information in short interest.  In Panel A, the mean coefficient on 
FREV is positive and statistically significant (θ1 = 0.9826; p-value < 0.05).  I find that 
the coefficient on FREV is positive in 46 of the 61 quarterly regressions.  The percentage 
of positive coefficients allows rejection of the null hypothesis that the percentage is 50% 
(χ2 = 15.75; p-value < 0.01).  I also find that the coefficient on each of the three risk 
factors is significant in the expected direction.   
In Table 7, Panel B I present the estimation results for model (10) after 
controlling for the information in short interest.  Consistent with H2, the mean 
  
59 
coefficient on FREV remains positive and statistically significant (θ1 = 0.8903; p-value < 
0.05) and is positive in 45 of the 61 quarterly regressions.  The percentage of positive 
coefficients allows rejection of the null hypothesis that the percentage is 50% (χ2 = 
13.79; p-value < 0.01).  As expected, I also find that the coefficient on RSIdec is 
negative and significant (θ6 = -0.0430; p-value < 0.01), suggesting that short interest 
contains information about future abnormal returns.     
4.4.2. Portfolio Tests based on Short Interest and Analyst Forecast Revisions  
In this sub-section, I investigate a practical implication of H2.  The results 
presented in Table 7 reveal that analyst forecast revisions contain information that is 
useful for predicting abnormal returns beyond the information in short interest.   This 
implies that investors could improve returns predictions using short interest by 
incorporating information in analyst forecast revisions about future returns.  I test this 
implication by calculating return spreads for extreme portfolios (i.e., return for the 
highest portfolio minus return for the lowest portfolio) formed using short-interest alone 
to return spreads for portfolios formed using both short-interest and the sign of the 
analyst forecast revisions.   
I begin by estimating abnormal returns for the six months following the 
formation of portfolios formed based on the magnitude of the RSI ratio.  I test whether 
the abnormal returns to each portfolio are significantly different from zero using t-tests 
based on the time-series means and standard errors, and report the results in Table 8.  In 
Panel A, I observe a nearly monotonic negative association between the RSI ratio 
portfolios and future abnormal returns, ranging from 3.0% (p-value < 0.01) for firms  
  
60 
TABLE 7 
The Association between Analyst Forecast Revisions and Subsequent Abnormal Returns  
with and without Controlling for Short Interest 
Model (10):  ABRET6t = θ0 + θ1 FREVt + θ2 RETt + θ3 LnMVEt + θ4 LnBTMt+ θ6 RSIdect + ε 
 
Panel A:  Without Controlling for Short Interest  Panel B:  Controlling for Short Interest 
Variable Mean 
(Coef) 
t-stat   #Pos 
(#Neg)  
Mean 
(Coef) 
t-stat   #Pos 
(#Neg) 
Intercept 0.0657 2.97 *** 41(20)  0.0643 2.87 *** 40(21) 
FREVt 0.9826 2.54 ** 46(15)  0.8903 2.33 ** 45(16) 
RETt 0.0177 2.52 ** 43(18)  0.0162 2.28 ** 42(19) 
LnMVEt -0.0075 -2.28 ** 28(33)  -0.0053 -1.53  28(33) 
LnBTMt 0.0147 1.78 * 37(24)  0.0115 1.44  37(24) 
RSIdec      -0.0430 -4.34 *** 18(43) 
          
Firms (Ave.) 1,482     1,482    
R2 (Ave.) 0.03     0.03    
 
________________ 
*, **, *** indicates significant at the p < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level respectively.  See Table 1 for variable definitions.  The number of firms and R2 reported 
are the averages across the quarterly cross-sectional regressions.   
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TABLE 8 
Abnormal Returns to Portfolios Formed Using Short Interest or  
Short Interest and Analyst Forecast Revisions 
  
 
Panel A 
 
Panel B 
 
 
All Firms 
 
Positive Forecast 
Revision 
 
No Forecast 
Revision   
Negative Forecast 
Revision 
 Portfolio N Abret6 
 
N Abret6 
 
N Abret6 
 
N Abret6 
 Lowest RSI Ratios 40039 0.030 *** 5537 0.049 *** 21337 0.041 *** 13165 0.004 
 1 5007 0.025 *** 767 -0.012 
 
2551 0.038 *** 1689 0.023 
 2 5041 0.026 * 729 0.010 
 
2512 0.037 ** 1800 0.010 
 3 5049 0.018 * 705 0.000 
 
2452 0.033 ** 1892 0.005 
 4 5044 0.017 * 773 0.026 
 
2414 0.035 *** 1857 -0.006 
 5 5034 0.006 
 
731 0.021 
 
2411 0.014 
 
1892 -0.012 
 6 5050 0.004 
 
750 -0.012 
 
2391 0.018 
 
1909 -0.013 
 7 5051 -0.010 
 
721 -0.030 * 2405 0.015 
 
1925 -0.022 
 8 5042 -0.010 
 
715 0.017 
 
2438 -0.009 
 
1889 -0.021 
 9 5048 -0.012 
 
702 -0.014 
 
2457 0.003 
 
1889 -0.030 * 
Highest RSI Ratios 5022 -0.037 *** 729 -0.014 
 
2315 -0.013 
 
1978 -0.073 *** 
             Extreme Portfolio 
Return Spread 
 
0.067 *** 
       
0.122 *** 
Difference Return 
Spreads 
          
0.054 *** 
________________ 
*, **, *** indicates significant at the p < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level respectively.  See Table 1 for variable definitions.  The returns to the extreme portfolios 
used in calculated the return spreads are bolded.   
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FIGURE 4 
Six-Month Abnormal Returns to Portfolios Formed Using Short Interest or  
Short Interest and Analyst Forecast Revisions 
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________________ 
Firm-quarters with less than 0.5% of outstanding shares sold short are grouped into the RSI portfolio 0.  Firm-quarters with more than 0.5% of 
outstanding shares sold short are grouped into portfolios 1 – 10 based on the magnitude of the RSIratio.  Each RSI portfolio is partition into three-
partfolios based on the sign of the consensus analyst forecast revision.  Pos Rev consists of firm where LFEPS – FFEPS > 0; No Rev consists of firms 
where LFEPS – FFEPS = 0; and Neg Rev consists of firms where LFEPS – FFEPS < 0.  Variable Definitions:  ABRET6 is the market-adjusted buy-and-
hold return, measured as the realized daily return cumulated over the period beginning the day after the last consensus earnings forecast date and ending 
180 days later (approximately six-months) minus the corresponding value-weighted market return for the same period.    
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with the lowest RSI ratios to -3.7% (p-value < 0.01) for firms with the highest RSI 
ratios.  I find that the spread in returns between the extreme portfolios is 6.7% (p-value < 
0.01).  A graph of the returns is provided in Figure 4.    
 Next, I incorporate information in analyst forecasts by partitioning each RSI ratio 
portfolio into three portfolios based on the sign of the forecast revision (i.e., positive 
revision, no revision, or negative revision).  The six-month abnormal return to each of 
these portfolios is presented in Table 8, Panel B and is graphed in Figure 4.  I find that 
the extreme portfolios based on consistent signals from short-sellers and analysts 
produce the largest abnormal returns.  Specifically, the portfolio of stocks with the 
lowest RSI ratios and positive forecast revisions (good news – good news) earns an 
average abnormal return of 4.9% (p-value < 0.01) over the next six months.  On the 
opposite extreme, the portfolio of stocks with the highest RSI ratios and negative 
forecast revisions (bad news – bad news) earns an average abnormal return of -7.3% (p-
value < 0.01).  Thus the spread in returns between these extreme portfolios is 12.2% (p-
value < 0.01), which is significantly greater than the spread in returns using the extreme 
portfolios formed based on the magnitude of the RSI ratio alone of 6.7% (p-value < 
0.01).   
 The results presented in Table 8, Panel B, also reveal significant differences 
within the extreme RSI ratio portfolios.  Specifically, for the portfolios of stocks with the 
lowest RSI ratios, the average abnormal return for firms with positive forecast revisions 
of 4.9% is significantly greater than the average abnormal return for firms with negative 
forecast revisions of 0.4% (p-value < 0.01; untabulated).  On the opposite extreme, for 
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the portfolio of stocks with the highest RSI ratios, the average abnormal return for firms 
with negative forecast revisions of -7.3% is significantly greater than the average 
abnormal return for firms with positive forecast revisions of -1.4% (p-value < 0.01; 
untabulated).   
 In sum, the results presented in Table 8 and Figure 4 demonstrate the benefits of 
refining signals from short interest about future returns using information contained in 
analyst forecast revisions.   
4.4.3. Four-Factor Regressions 
 Next, I address whether the portfolio returns estimated in Table 9, Panels A and 
B, are robust to controls for omitted factors related to risk which are correlated with 
returns such as the market return, size, book-to-market, and momentum.  I estimate the 
following firm-specific, model (firm subscripts omitted):    
Rd – RFd = α + γ1 (RMd - RFd) + γ2 SMBd + γ3 HMLd + γ4 UMDd + ε,  (11) 
where:   
 
d = Day indicator; 
 
R = Raw stock return on day d; 
 
RF =  One-month treasury bill rate divided by the number of trading days in the 
month; 
 
RM = Value-weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks on day 
d; 
 
SMB =  Return on a portfolio of small stocks less the return on a portfolio of big 
stocks on day d; 
 
HML =  Return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks less the return on a 
portfolio of low book-to-market stocks on day d; and 
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UMD = Return on a portfolio of stocks that were past winners less the return on 
the portfolio of stocks that were past winners.36 
 
 In each fiscal quarter, I estimate model (11) separately for each firm using the 
daily stock returns for the 180-day period beginning the day after the last consensus 
analyst forecast date.  This yields separate coefficient estimates for each firm-quarter.  
The intercept, α, estimates the average daily abnormal return for a particular firm over 
the estimation period.37  A positive (negative) intercept indicates that the firm has 
performed better (worse) than would be expected after controlling for the market, size, 
book-to-market, and momentum risk factors.  Each quarter, I average the firm-specific 
coefficient estimates across all firms within a particular portfolio.  This yields a time-
series of average coefficient estimates for each portfolio.  I then assess statistical 
significance by calculating a t-statistic based on the time-series means and standard 
errors for each portfolio.   
 In Table 9, I present the estimation results for model (11) using portfolios formed 
based on the magnitude of RSI ratios only.  The results are consistent with the results 
presented in Table 8.  I find a monotonic negative relationship between the RSI ratio 
portfolios and the intercept, α, ranges from 4.5 basis points per trading day for the firms 
with the lowest RSI ratios to -2.5 basis points per trading day for firms with the highest 
RSI ratios.  The spread in returns between the extreme portfolios is 7.0 basis points and 
is statistically significant (p < 0.01).  Given the average number of trading days in the  
                                                 
36 I obtained the data on the four-factors from Ken French’s website:  http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu 
/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html. 
37 Since I use daily returns to estimate model (11), the results are tabulated in terms of percentage points 
such that an alpha of 0.045 represents 4.5 basis points per trading day.    
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TABLE 9 
Four-Factor Regression Results for Portfolios Formed Using Short Interest 
 
Model (11):  Rd – RFd = α + γ1 (RMd - RFd) + γ2 SMBd + γ3 HMLd + γ4 UMDd + ε 
 
 
RSI   Alpha   RM-RF   SMB   HML   UMD   
Port.   Mean   Mean   Mean   Mean   Mean   
0 
 
0.045 *** 0.896 *** 0.755 *** 0.310 *** -0.065 *** 
1 
 
0.027 *** 1.089 *** 0.685 *** 0.227 *** -0.065 *** 
2 
 
0.020 *** 1.129 *** 0.679 *** 0.250 *** -0.066 *** 
3 
 
0.023 *** 1.152 *** 0.700 *** 0.207 *** -0.074 *** 
4 
 
0.019 *** 1.187 *** 0.704 *** 0.192 *** -0.079 *** 
5 
 
0.016 ** 1.226 *** 0.780 *** 0.196 *** -0.109 *** 
6 
 
0.010 * 1.222 *** 0.790 *** 0.129 *** -0.149 *** 
7 
 
0.003 
 
1.245 *** 0.805 *** 0.059 * -0.180 *** 
8 
 
0.004 
 
1.246 *** 0.862 *** -0.045 
 
-0.173 *** 
9 
 
0.000 
 
1.311 *** 0.919 *** -0.059 
 
-0.199 *** 
10 
 
-0.025 *** 1.337 *** 0.951 *** -0.107 ** -0.210 *** 
            Extreme Portfolio Spread 
       
  
0.070 *** 
         
________________ 
*, **, *** indicates significant at the p < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level respectively.  I estimate model (9) 
separately for each firm-quarter using the daily stock returns for the 180-day period beginning the day 
after the last consensus analyst forecast date.  This yields separate coefficient estimates for each firm-
quarter.  I then average the quarterly firm-specific coefficient estimates across all firms within a particular 
portfolio.  This yields a time-series of average coefficient estimates for each portfolio.  I assess statistical 
significance by calculating a t-statistic based on the time-series means and standard errors for each 
portfolio.  The estimates are stated in terms of daily percentage points (i.e., an alpha of 0.045 represents 
4.5 basis points per trading day).   The extreme portfolios used to calculate the return spread are bolded.   
 
 
 
 
estimation period of 125 days across the full sample, this return spread translates into a 
6-month abnormal return of approximately 9.14% (calculated as e0.0007 × 125).  
 With respect to the coefficients (i.e., risk-factor loadings) on the control 
variables, I find that portfolios formed based on the magnitude of short interest are 
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positively associated with market risk and negatively associated with firm size, book-to-
market, and momentum.  Thus, I find that short-sellers target small growth stocks with 
high systematic risk and negative momentum on average, which is consistent with prior 
research (e.g., Dechow et al. 2001; Asquith et al. 2005).       
 In Table 10, I present the estimation results for model (11) using portfolios 
formed based on the magnitude of the RSI ratio and the sign of the consensus forecast 
revision.  The results in Panels A, B, and C are for RSI portfolios with positive, no, and 
negative forecast revisions, respectively.  Across all three panels, I find that the lowest 
RSI ratio portfolio has the highest α and the highest RSI ratio portfolio has the lowest α.  
As reported in Panel C, the return spread between the portfolio of stocks with the lowest 
RSI ratio and positive forecast revisions (good news – good news) and the portfolio of 
stocks with the highest RSI ratio and negative forecast revisions (bad news – bad news) 
is 9.3 basis points per trading day (or approximately 12.3% over the next 6 months).  
This return spread is significantly greater than the return spread of 7 basis points 
(reported in Table 10) using the extreme portfolios formed based on the magnitude of 
RSI ratios only (p-value < 0.05).     
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TABLE 10 
Four-Factor Regression Results for Portfolios Formed Using Short Interest and 
Analyst Forecast Revisions 
 
Model (11):  Rd – RFd = α + γ1 (RMd - RFd) + γ2 SMBd + γ3 HMLd + γ4 UMDd + ε 
 
 
Panel A:  Positive Forecast Revisions 
 
RSI   Alpha   RM-RF   SMB   HML   UMD   
Port.   Mean   Mean   Mean   Mean   Mean   
0 
 
0.046 *** 0.956 *** 0.770 *** 0.335 *** 0.008 
 1 
 
0.010 
 
1.134 *** 0.598 *** 0.294 *** -0.029 
 2 
 
0.017 
 
1.142 *** 0.613 *** 0.333 *** 0.033 
 3 
 
0.005 
 
1.174 *** 0.614 *** 0.255 *** 0.044 
 4 
 
0.015 
 
1.235 *** 0.664 *** 0.307 *** 0.067 * 
5 
 
0.020 
 
1.239 *** 0.737 *** 0.227 *** -0.022 
 6 
 
0.000 
 
1.293 *** 0.778 *** 0.135 ** -0.013 
 7 
 
-0.009 
 
1.282 *** 0.852 *** 0.132 * 0.053 
 8 
 
0.010 
 
1.283 *** 0.843 *** -0.097 
 
-0.074 
 9 
 
0.001 
 
1.305 *** 0.845 *** -0.047 
 
-0.048 
 10 
 
-0.015 
 
1.339 *** 0.932 *** -0.244 ** -0.110 
  
Panel B: No Forecast Revision 
 
RSI   Alpha   RM-RF   SMB   HML   UMD   
Port.   Mean   Mean   Mean   Mean   Mean   
0 
 
0.054 *** 0.879 *** 0.756 *** 0.294 *** -0.041 *** 
1 
 
0.035 *** 1.109 *** 0.713 *** 0.182 *** 0.022 
 2 
 
0.028 *** 1.120 *** 0.698 *** 0.191 *** 0.009 
 3 
 
0.036 *** 1.125 *** 0.686 *** 0.082 * -0.019 
 4 
 
0.034 *** 1.175 *** 0.710 *** 0.072 
 
-0.011 
 5 
 
0.019 ** 1.202 *** 0.759 *** 0.135 ** -0.020 
 6 
 
0.016 ** 1.199 *** 0.800 *** 0.032 
 
-0.066 * 
7 
 
0.014 
 
1.240 *** 0.825 *** -0.055 
 
-0.114 *** 
8 
 
0.004 
 
1.242 *** 0.860 *** -0.127 * -0.071 * 
9 
 
0.009 
 
1.293 *** 0.909 *** -0.197 *** -0.124 *** 
10 
 
-0.010 
 
1.317 *** 0.932 *** -0.171 *** -0.128 *** 
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TABLE 10 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Negative Forecast Revision 
 
RSI   Alpha   RM-RF   SMB   HML   UMD   
Port.   Mean   Mean   Mean   Mean   Mean   
0 
 
0.028 *** 0.904 *** 0.757 *** 0.329 *** -0.134 *** 
1 
 
0.025 ** 1.040 *** 0.662 *** 0.234 *** -0.211 *** 
2 
 
0.009 
 
1.140 *** 0.686 *** 0.292 *** -0.200 *** 
3 
 
0.013 * 1.206 *** 0.780 *** 0.344 *** -0.166 *** 
4 
 
0.002 
 
1.187 *** 0.725 *** 0.281 *** -0.216 *** 
5 
 
0.009 
 
1.241 *** 0.804 *** 0.271 *** -0.247 *** 
6 
 
0.004 
 
1.218 *** 0.787 *** 0.248 *** -0.301 *** 
7 
 
0.002 
 
1.235 *** 0.771 *** 0.137 *** -0.358 *** 
8 
 
0.007 
 
1.227 *** 0.861 *** 0.058 
 
-0.317 *** 
9 
 
-0.012 
 
1.318 *** 0.951 *** 0.102 * -0.374 *** 
10 
 
-0.046 *** 1.358 *** 0.967 *** -0.008 
 
-0.348 *** 
            Extreme Portfolio Spread 
       
  
0.093 *** 
        
            Difference in Extreme Portfolio Spread 
     
  
0.022 ** 
         
________________ 
*, **, *** indicates significant at the p < 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 level respectively.  I estimate model (9) 
separately for each firm-quarter using the daily stock returns for the 180-day period beginning the day 
after the last consensus analyst forecast date.  This yields separate coefficient estimates for each firm-
quarter.  I then average the quarterly firm-specific coefficient estimates across all firms within a particular 
portfolio.  This yields a time-series of average coefficient estimates for each portfolio.  I assess statistical 
significance by calculating a t-statistic based on the time-series means and standard errors for each 
portfolio.  The estimates are stated in terms of daily percentage points (i.e., an alpha of 0.045 represents 
4.5 basis points per trading day).   The extreme portfolios used to calculate the return spread are bolded.   
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5. CONCLUSION 
 The objective of this study is to investigate whether short-sellers and financial 
analysts play complementary roles as information intermediaries in the capital markets 
by developing distinct information about future firm performance that is useful to 
investors.  I investigate these two intermediaries because they both predict future firm 
performance, but they are likely to develop different types of value-relevant information, 
consistent with their incentives. 
The first main finding is that the relative short interest ratio contains useful 
information for predicting earnings beyond the information in analysts’ earnings 
forecasts.  I find that the relative short interest ratio is negatively associated with 
subsequent analyst forecast errors, suggesting that analyst forecasts do not fully 
incorporate the information in the relative short interest ratio about future earnings in 
their forecasts.  This implies that, on average, analysts are inefficient (i.e., overly-
optimistic) about firms with high short-interest levels.  However, additional tests reveal 
that analyst inefficiency with respect to short interest is significantly reduced for firms 
with high analyst following relative to firms with low analyst following suggesting that 
short-sellers play a particularly important role as information intermediaries when 
analyst following is low.  Finally, I demonstrate that analyst forecasts can be improved 
(i.e., made less biased and more accurate) by adjusting forecasts using short interest 
information.   
 The second main finding is that analyst forecast revisions contain information 
that is useful for predicting returns beyond the information in the relative short interest 
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ratio and after controlling for returns from common risk factors (i.e., market return, size, 
book-to-market, and momentum).  I demonstrate that returns predictions based on short 
interest can be refined by incorporating information in the sign of the analyst forecast 
revision.  Specifically, I find that portfolios constructed using consistent signals from 
short-sellers and analysts (i.e., lowest RSI ratios and positive forecast revision or highest 
RSI ratios and negative forecast revision) produce significantly larger spreads in future 
abnormal returns (adjusted for risk factors) than portfolios constructed using signals 
from short-sellers alone.    
 From a practical perspective, this study provides two investment implications.  
First, the results suggest that investors who use analyst forecasts to make investment 
decisions (e.g., in valuation models) can benefit from adjusting the analyst forecasts 
using short interest information.  Second, the results suggest that investors can benefit 
from taking long positions in stocks with low RSI ratios and positive consensus forecast 
revisions and that they should be particularly wary of holding long positions in stocks 
with high RSI ratios and negative consensus forecast revisions.   These implications are 
important because they highlight the benefits of using multiple sources for information 
about future firm performance, particularly when the intermediaries providing the 
information are likely to use different information sets or to use similar information sets 
differently.   
 Taken together, the results suggest that short-sellers and financial analysts 
develop reliable, complementary information about future firm performance, and that 
predictions based on information from one intermediary can be improved by 
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incorporating information provided by the other intermediary. This study adds to the 
emerging notion that short-sellers potentially play a role as information intermediaries in 
the capital markets and complements prior research by providing additional evidence 
that short-sellers possess value-relevant information.   In addition, this study contributes 
to several streams of academic research.  The results contribute to the earnings 
prediction literature by showing that short interest positions contain information that is 
useful for predicting earnings levels and changes disclosed in the next two earnings 
announcements.  The results contribute to the analyst forecast literature by documenting 
that analyst forecasts do not fully reflect short interest information.  Finally, the results 
contribute to the short interest literature by demonstrating that the signal in high levels of 
short interest (e.g., bad news may be imminent) can be further refined by using analyst 
forecast revisions. 
 Several unresolved issues emerge from this study.  The results demonstrate that 
short-sellers act as if they use information to anticipate future earnings, but do not 
establish that they explicitly forecast earnings.  It is also unclear which information sets 
short-sellers (e.g., financial statements) use to take their positions.  Future research 
might focus on identifying the information sets short-sellers use to predict price declines 
and in assessing whether accounting information plays a significant role in forming their 
predictions.  The results also suggest that the consensus analyst forecast is inefficient 
with respect to short interest information; however, the source of this inefficiency is 
currently unexplored.  Investigating the factors associated with short interest inefficiency 
of individual analysts is another interesting avenue for future research.  Finally, while it 
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is clear that short interest information has predictive content, there is still relatively little 
evidence of a significant investor response to disclosures of short interest and no 
evidence (to my knowledge) of managers’ responses to the same.  I believe this to be a 
promising area of future research.        
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APPENDIX A 
 
VARIABLE DEFINTIONS 
 
 
Short Interest Data: 
  
RSIratio Relative short interest ratio calculated as the number of  shares sold short 
divided by the number of shares outstanding 
  
RSIdec Decile ranking of the RSIratio.  For firms with less than 0.5% of the 
outstanding shares sold short, RSIdec is set equal to 0.  Firms with more than 
0.5% of the outstanding shares sold short are grouped into deciles based on 
the magnitude of the RSIratio.  RSIdec is scaled to range between [0, 1]. 
  
COMPUSTAT Data: 
  
MVE Market value of equity measured as the stock price times the number of shares 
outstanding (COMPUSTAT data14 x COMPUSTAT data 61). 
  
LnMVE Natural log of the market value of equity. 
  
BTM Book-to-market ratio measured as book equity divided by the market value of 
equity (COMPUSTAT data59/MVE).  
  
LnBTM Natural log of the book-to-market ratio. 
  
CRSP Data:   
  
ABRET6 Market-adjusted buy-and-hold return, measured as the realized daily return 
cumulated over the period beginning the day after the last consensus earnings 
forecast date and ending 180 days later (approximately six-months) minus the 
corresponding value-weighted market return for the same period.   If a firm 
delists during the return accumulation period, I compound the delisting return 
with the buy-and-hold return and assume the liquidating proceeds are 
reinvested in the market portfolio for the remainder of the period.   
  
RET The raw buy-and-hold return, measured as the realized monthly return, 
cumulated over the twelve-month period ending on the quarter-end date.    
  
I/B/E/S Data:   
  
EPS Actual earnings per share, scaled by the beginning of quarter stock price 
[COMPUSTAT data14]. 
  
ΔEPS Seasonal change in actual earnings per share, scaled by the beginning of 
quarter stock price [COMPUSTAT data14]. 
  
LOSS Indicator variable set equal to one if earnings per share as reported by I/B/E/S 
is negative, and zero otherwise. 
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LFEPS The last consensus analyst forecast for EPS, scaled by the beginning of 
quarter stock price [COMPUSTAT data14]. 
  
FFEPS The first consensus analyst forecast for EPS, scaled by the beginning of 
quarter stock price [COMPUSTAT data14]. 
  
LFΔEPS The last consensus analyst forecast for quarterly earnings per share issued 
after the prior quarter’s earnings announcement, less earnings per share in the 
same quarter one year prior, scaled by the beginning of quarter stock price 
[COMPUSTAT data14] 
  
FFΔEPS The first consensus analyst forecast for quarterly earnings per share issued 
after the prior quarter’s earnings announcement, less earnings per share in the 
same quarter one year prior, scaled by the beginning of quarter stock price 
[COMPUSTAT data14] 
  
FE EPS minus LFEPS 
  
FREV LFEPS minus FFEPS 
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